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L Introduction
As Indian tribes across the country work to maintain or revive their
traditional cultures in the face of continuous assimilationist pressures, they are
recognizing the key role that tribal courts must play to win that struggle.' In
particular, by bringing their unwritten customary law, or common law," into
the imposed Anglo-American style tribal court systems, tribes are resurrecting,
institutionalizing, and applying to the cases that come before them the norms
and values that underlie the tribal traditions and customs? The courts of the
0
1. See Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225
(1989) (discussing the obligation of tribal courts to defend against the encroachment of Anglo-
American cultural values through law) [hereinafter Tso, Process]. An independent court system
is clearly a source of empowerment for tribes. See Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and
Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 421-22 (1992);
Fredric Brandfon, Comment, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court
System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1000 (1991); Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian
Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 231, 274 (1987); Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of
Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1398-400 (1985).
2. In 1987, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court announced its preference for the term
"common law" over "customary" or "traditional" law, for the reason that the former term
"properly emphasizes the fact that Navajo custom and tradition is law, and more accurately
reflects the similarity in the treatment of custom between Navajo and English common law." In
re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie, 5 Navajo Rptr. 161, 165 (Navajo 1987) (emphasis in original); see
also James W. Zion, Harmony Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MoNT. L. REv.
265, 269-70 (1984) (discussing the foundation of American common law in customs and
traditions); Richard Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law 1: Notes on Political Organization,
Property and Inheritance, 9 MUSEUM NOTES: MUSEUM OF N. ARIZ. 17, 17 (1936) (using term
"Navajo common law" for the legal traditions of the tribe).
For the purposes of this comment, however, "common law," "customary law," and "traditional
law" are used interchangeably to denote that body of tribal legal traditions and customs, and the
underlying cultural norms and values, applied by the tribal courts.
3. See, e.g., Spotted Tail v. Spotted Tail, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6032, 6032 (Rosebud Sioux Trib. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that "it is well within the
framework of Lakota tradition and custom that placement [of children of divorced parents] be
made, if appropriate, with a member of the extended family, particularly when that individual has
provided substantial care and nurture to any of the children"); Hepler v. Perkins, 13 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6011, 6016 (Sitka Community Ass'n Trib. Ct. 1986)
(taking note of tribal Court of Elders decision applying traditional law to resolve child custody
dispute); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6031,
6033 (Cheyenne River Sioux Trib. Ct. 1985) (holding, pursuant to tribal custom and usage, that
custody of spouse's dead body lies in surviving spouse); In re K.D.M., 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6002, 6002 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1984) (finding a
right to due process based in tribal traditions); Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6008, 6010 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing
No. 2]
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Navajo Nation have been leaders in this movement,4 especially since the early
1980s, when the Navajo Court of Appeals (later to become the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court) initiated its Navajo Common Law Project (the Project).'
traditional tribal kinship systems).
As one author has noted, "tribal courts are ideally situated to serve as a bridge between local
tribal culture and the dominant legal system." Pommersheim, supra note 1, at 412. As the power
and security of the courts increase, the tribal jurisprudence can "reflect[] the aspiration and
wisdom of traditional cultures seeking a future of liberation and self-realization in which age old
values may continue to flourish in contemporary circumstances." Id. at 413.
It should be noted that there exists a range of tribal court structures in the United States.
Some courts are organized by the tribes themselves under the tribal constitutions. Taylor, supra
note I, at 237. Others, the so-called CFR courts, are subject to federal regulation. See 25 C.F.R.
§ 11.1 (1992). The various Pueblo tribes of the American Southwest also apply traditional law
through their tribal councils. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
62 (2d ed. 1988).
The modem Navajo tribal court system was developed by the Navajo Nation Tribal Council
between 1948 and 1959 and does not owe its existence to a constitutional provision. See Stephen
Conn, Mid-Passage - The Navajo Tribe and Its First Legal Revolution, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
329, 332 (1978). Although its legislative origins might suggest a lack of judicial independence,
the Navajo system has in practice established itself as an integral and assertive branch of tribal
government. Certainly, no other tribal court system is as sophisticated in structure and resources,
and more widely viewed as a model of successful tribal judicial self-reliance, than the Navajo
courts. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 236; Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under
Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 18 (1979); Murray Campbell, Navajo Justice
System Wins Farflung Praise, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 16, 1991, at 17. But see SAMUEL
J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 100, 103
(1978) (condemning tribal court systems, including that of the Navajo Nation, as "little more than
pale copies of the white system," and arguing that "it would be more realistic to abandon the
[tribal court] system altogether and to deal with Indian civil and criminal problems in the regular
county and state court systems").
4. The Navajo tribal court system consists of seven district courts and five family courts
scattered around the 25,351 square mile reservation in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, as well
as a supreme court (of appeals) in Window Rock, Arizona. NAVAJO NATION JUDICIAL BRANCH,
FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT. JAN.-MAR., FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 11-12 [hereinafter REPORT].
In addition, many matters are handled through special judicially created court procedures,
including the small claims procedure and the Peacemaker Court. See JAMES W. ZION & NELSON
MCCABE, NAvAJO PEACEMAKER COURT MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE NAVAJO
PEACEMAKER COURT FOR JUDGES, COMMUNITY LEADERS AND COURT PERSONNEL (1982)
[hereinafter MANUAL]; RULES FOR SMALL CLAIMS PROCEEDINGS (1990) (issued by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court). Note that the Navajo Court of Appeals was supplanted by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court, which was created by the Tribal Council in 1985. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE
tit. 7, § 301 (Supp. 1984-85).
5. James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommoda-
tion to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89, 92 (1983) [hereinafter Zion, Peacemaker Court]. In
1991, the solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court issued a prospectus announcing updated
goals for the Navajo Common Law Project, including: the undertaking of comprehensive research
on Navajo common law; the development of a court archive of relevant materials; the collection
of oral histories of the Navajo; the writing of a definitive treatise on Navajo common law;
renewed efforts to employ Navajo common law in court decisions; and others. James W. Zion,
Prospectus: A Project for the Development of Navajo Common Law 6-9 (July 29, 1991)
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Although customary Navajo law had been applied by the tribal courts even
before decisions began to be published in 1969,6 the Project signaled the
beginning of a new, less inhibited effort to revive the Navajo common law.
The most far-reaching exercise of custom and tradition by the Navajo
courts took place just as the Project got underway, when the judges of the
courts formally adopted the rules establishing the Navajo Peacemaker Court.!
In 1981 Navajo Nation Tribal Chairman Peter MacDonald took steps to
examine how customs and traditions could be incorporated into the court
system itself! These official efforts dissipated due to lack of funding, but the
Navajo courts were galvanized into considering the issue One of the first
findings, made after consultation with authorities on traditional Navajo dispute
resolution procedures, was that a form of local mediation had been the
predominant customary means of handling legal problems." Inspired, the
judges of the Navajo courts convened in 1982 to consider the possibility of
reestablishing the traditional Navajo mediation mechanisms in the courts
themselves." In their discussions, the judges noted that many community
problems were especially unsuited to resolution by litigation, that lawsuits
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Zion, Prospectus].
From the author's experience working for the Navajo Nation Supreme Court between May and
August 1992, progress is being made toward some of these goals, particularly the researching and
archiving of anthropological, sociological, and legal materials bearing on Navajo common law.
The court has begun a digest of such materials, and is working on an index. On the other hand,
no work was yet being done on any kind of Navajo common law treatise, and it was too early
to tell if the courts had increased their frequency of common law usage from what it was before
the prospectus was issued. The factor that most inhibits the efforts of the court to develop Navajo
common law is, of course, a lack of funding.
6. See Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6049, 6Q50 (Navajo 1991); Conn, supra note 3, at 368-70.
7. MANuAL, supra note 4, at 2.
8. Zion, Peacemaker Court, supra note 5, at 92-93.
9. Id. at 93-94.
10. Il at 94-97. In a 1982 decision, Judge Tom Tso of the Window Rock District Court
ordered traditional mediation to resolve a marriage dispute. In re Marriage of Allison, 3 Navajo
Rptr. 199, 199 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982). Tso took-note of "a long-standing custom and
tradition among the Navajo people for a judge of the Navajo Tribal Courts to appoint a member
of the community to mediate and conciliate problems among members of the community." Id.
at 199.
There is also evidence that such mediation was an ongoing, widespread, ad hoe means of
resolving disputes, which persisted unofficially even after courts were first established by the
federal government in the Navajo Nation. James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court, 15-
4/16-1 PERCEPTION 48, 49 (1992) [hereinafter Zion, Navajo]; Raymond D. Austin, Navajo
Common Law Principles and Alternative Dispute Resolution 7 (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (Austin currently serves as Associate Justice on the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court.).
11. Zion, Peacemaker Court, supra note 5, at 98-99.
12. The Navajo Peacemaker Court Manual indicates various kinds of disputes for which use
of the court would be appropriate: family disputes, problems among neighbors (such as
"nuisances, animal trespass or annoyance, conduct which bothers others and like things"), alcohol-
No. 2]
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were prohibitively expensive and time-consuming for most Navajos, and that
less-acculturated Navajos were unfamiliar with, and therefore at a disadvan-
tage in, the imposed litigious system. 3 The solicitor to the court of appeals
presented a proposed outline of a court procedure, to be established under the
rule-making authority of the courts instead of through the Navajo Tribal
Council, that would formally institutionalize the customary mediation
techniques of dispute resolution. 4 After much debate, the judges agreed to
implement the procedure on an experimental basis, and the Navajo Peacemak-
er Court was born. 5
Parties electing to attempt resolution of their dispute through the Peace-
maker Court choose a peacemaker, traditionally called a naataanii,'6 or have
one selected for them by the local chapter government or the district court.7
related problems among family and neighbors, sexual misconduct, torts, "[b]usiness matters of
$1,5000 Isic] or less," and "[a]ny other matter the District Judge feels should be or can be taken
care of in the Peacemaker Court." MANUAL, supra note 4, at 7-8.
Tradiionally, mediation was apparently used to resolve most serious problems among
community members, including criminal matters. William Bluehouse Johnson, currently serving
on the Laguna and Isleta Pueblo tribal courts, has noted that customary Navajo mediation was
of use to some of the judges [of the early Navajo tribal courts] as part of settling
either criminal or civil cases.
For example, if a Navajo judge perceived that underlying reasons like fencing
ard boundary disputes were at the root of an assault case, then that judge might
refuse to hear the case as a criminal action. Instead the judge could bring the
disputants together and have them work out those underlying problems that led to
the assault. A judge would also offer advise [sic] by lecturing on values of
cooperation and harmony in the community in the manner of traditional headmen.
William B. Johnson, Navajo Peacemaker Court: Impact and Efficacy of Traditional Dispute
Resolution in the Modem Setting 6 (1990) (unpublished J.D. thesis, University of New Mexico).
In practice, the Peacemaker Court has been used to deal with such matters as child abuse, an
offense which in the Anglo legal system is considered criminal. Id. at 28 (citing information
provided by the Chinle and Ramah district courts).
13. MIANUAL, supra note 4, at 2-3.
14. Zion, Peacemaker Court, supra note 5, at 98.
15. l. at 98-99. The adopted rules establishing the Peacemaker Court indicate that the court
"is an experiment in preserving an important and fundamental tradition by supporting it with the
modem legal methods of written rules and procedures." MANUAL, supra note 4, at 156-57.
16. Tom Tso, former Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, has described the
significance of the naat'aanii:
That term has been translated as "peace chief," but it also means something
greater. The Navajo language uses action words to describe things. This word
refers to someone who can speak well in public. If the community hears someone
who speaks well, with the content of the speech showing wisdom, organization,
and spirituality, that person is naat'aanii.... A naat'aanii will lead discussions
to talk about others or talk out problems, and his or her word has a great bearing
on the group's decisions.
Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditionts, and Fairness in the Navajo Nation Code of Judicial
Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15, 17 (1992) [hereinafter Tso, Moral Principles]; see also Zion,
Navajo, supra note 10, at 49; 2 DAN VICENTI Er AL., THE LAW OF ThIE PEOPLE: DINE' BIBEE
HAZ'AANII 116-18 (1972) [hereinafter 2 VICENrI].




The peacemaker, often a community or religious leader or respected elder,
guides the ensuing discussions between the parties and other concerned
individuals, including family members." The peacemaker may also interject
his or her own perspectives, especially where a discourse on traditional
Navajo values is deemed appropriate. 9 When everyone has had their say, the
peacemaker generally wraps up the session with a prayer addressing the
concerns that have been raised? If a solution agreeable to the parties has
been reached during the course of the peacemaking session, then the results
may be written out and taken to the district judge for signature as a final
judgment.2' If the parties cannot agree, Anglo-style litigation through the
district court is still available to them.?
The Peacemaker Court celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1992. Unfortu-
nately, the statistics on its usage and success are not available. Evidence
Peacemaker Court 5 (July 6, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. NAVAJO PEACEMAKER CT. R. 2.2.
19. Id. at 2.2(c).
20. See HOzHOfl NAAT'AANIt (Navajo Peacemaker Court videotape 1992) (produced by the
Navajo Nation Judicial Branch); Raymond D. Austin, Incorporating Tribal Customs and
Traditions Into Tribal Court Decisions 7 (unpublished paper, delivered at 1992 Indian Law
Conference of the Federal Bar Association, Albuquerque, N.M., Apr. 2-3, 1992) (on file with
author). An observer at a peacemaking session involving a marital dispute between a young
couple described the proceedings:
Parties sit in a circle facing one another and listen to the others' point of view. A
mediator sits in the middle and listens intently to each side. Though some family
members grow impatient for their turn, they wait until the mediator recognizes
them to speak.
The dialog [sic] often turns into a stem, no holds barred lecture to the couple
by other family members, fluctuating from English to Navajo. A sister harshly
scolded her brother for the pain and heartache he caused the family.
Even when emotions run high, everything is spoken in a civil tone. Judging
from the tears that are wiped away, no one holds anything back. The court bailiff
provides a box of Kleenex.
Everyone gets their chance to speak to the issue and there is no time limit.
There are no lawyers to ask questions and no judge to rule on what is or isn't
relevant.
Within about 90 minutes, all the parties shake hands and the young couple
agrees to work together the try to save the marriage for themselves, their children
and their families.
... Based on a recorded transcript of the proceeding, Chinle District Court
Judge Wayne Cadman and his staff will write a binding court order to follow up
and enforce what the couple agreed on.
Richard Sitts, Navajo Peacemaking Makes a Comeback, THE INDEPENDENT (Gallup, N.M.), July
27, 1991, at 1. Note that apparently there is significant variation in the proceedings of
peacemaking sessions around the reservation. Johnson, supra note 12, at 31-34.
21. NAvAJO PEACEMAKER CT. R. 4.3.
22. Id. at 2.5.
23. One seasoned peacemaker, Freddy Lee, estimated in 1991 that 80% of the sessions were
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exists, however, that the procedure has become popular even on an unofficial
level, where peacemaking is apparently going on without resort to the courts
at all.' Certainly, the Navajo Peacemaker Court has been scrutinized with
interest by representatives of legal systems from around the world, including
those from litigious systems looking for alternatives and those from tribal
systems seeking ways to preserve their traditional legal methods within
nontraditional formalized systemsY
Although the creation of the Peacemaker Court may have been the single
most significant practical step yet taken by the Navajo Nation towards
reestablishing traditional Navajo law, the tribal courts have extended their
efforts within the confines of their Anglo-style judicial system as well. The
use of Navajo common law in written decisions of the Navajo courts has
increased dramatically over the nearly two-and-a-half decades since opinions
began to be published.' This comment offers an overview of that jurispru-
dence.
While this comment is organized under broad headings - criminal law,
contract law, tort law, and so on - familiar to students and practitioners of
Anglo law, this analytic framework must be recognized as of dubious validity
in the context of the customary law of the Navajo tribe. For example, the
fundamental Anglo differentiation between civil and criminal law was not
made at all under traditional Navajo law, wherein "criminal" and "civil"
matters were usually dealt with in the same fashion, by requiring restitution
effectively settled. Sitts, supra note 20, at 1. Note, however, that a 1990 commission chaired by
the senior judge from the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona concluded that the
Peacemaker Court was under-utilized. Zion, Prospectus, supra note 5,'at 3-4. The commission
recommended that the court be promoted more on a community level, and the Navajo courts
responded by hiring two Peacemaker Court "coordinators" to conduct the necessary outreach. Id.
at 4; see also Johnson, supra note 12, at 29 (noting a lack of public awareness of the Peacemaker
Court). In the Chinle district, which is recognized as one of the most active in peacemaking, the
Peacemaker Court was used for only eleven cases in 1988. Id. at 27 (citing information provided
by the Chinle District Court). The frequency of usage is currently on the increase, however.
Letter from James W. Zion, Solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, to author (Jan. 15,
1993) [hereinafter Letter].
24. Interview with James W. Zion, Solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Window
Rock, Adz. (July 1992).
25. See Zion, Peacemaker Court, supra note 5, at 108-09; Tso, Process, supra note 1, at
227; see also Austin, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that the Peacemaker Court has "become a model
,around the world").
26. See the appendix to this comment. Note that this comment is limited to an analysis of
published decisions only. As a consequence, lower court decisions are excluded except for those
few that have been selected for publication in the Navajo Reporter. See id. By far the majority
of opinions examined, therefore, are those of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court (or, before 1986,
the Navajo Court of Appeals). Because the development of Navajo common law depehds almost
exclusively on the body of published jurisprudence, the author does not view the regrettably small
sampling of lower court decisions as particularly relevant, on a practical level, to the usefulness
of this comment or its conclusions.
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to the victim by the offender. 7 The distinction thus makes little contextual
sense, and is flat out misleading if accepted as indicative of traditional Navajo
legal thinking. In the interest of translating the Navajo common law
jurisprudence into a language familiar to the largest audience, however, the
author has chosen to accept the dangers of an artificial and culturally biased
categorization.
To acknowledge one other shortcoming of this comment, it will be
apparent that depth of analysis was sacrificed for comprehensiveness in scope.
Nevertheless, the result will hopefully serve at least three functions: first, to
assist practitioners of law in the courts of the Navajo Nation, whose role in
continuing the development of the tribal common law is essential and who can
only help their clients by knowing how the courts have found and applied that
law; second, to describe for the benefit of tribal courts everywhere how one
particular tribe - the Navajo Nation - has set about the formidable task of
building a body of law founded on tribal customs and traditions; and, finally,
to promote an understanding of the challenge faced by Native American tribes
to preserve their cultures through law, and to show that, at least in the case
of the Navajo, only occasionally does that effort result in a fundamental
departure from Anglo-American common law, even if a particular shared legal
doctrine may spring from entirely divergent world views.
I. Using Navajo Common Law
A. Statutory Authority
Since its passage in 1977, the Navajo Tribal Code has mandated the
application of Navajo customs in the tribal courtsl The Code, moreover,
only restates tribal law that has been in force since 1959 regarding the use of
customary law.2 9 Thus, although the courts themselves have only recently
begun to openly and enthusiastically look to Navajo customs, usages, and
27. See infra notes 426-50 and accompanying text.
28. The Code provision reads:
§ 204. Law Applicable
(a) In all cases the Courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply any laws of the
United States that may be applicable and any laws or customs of the Navajo
Nation not prohibited by applicable federal laws.
(b) Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Navajo Nation
the court may request the advice of counsellors familiar with these customs and
usages.
(c) Any matters not covered by the traditional customs and usages or laws or
regulations of the Navajo Nation or by applicable federal laws and regulations,
may be decided by the Courts of the Navajo Nation according to the laws of the
state in which the matter in dispute may lie.
NAvAjo TRuB. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1984-85).
29. Navajo Tribal Council Res. CJA-l-59, § 1 (Jan. 6, 1959) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tits. 7, 8, 14, 17 (1977)).
No. 21 387
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traditions, the authority for doing so has existed for decades. The slow pace
of customary law development by the courts undoubtedly is the result of many
factors, including the gradually growing sense of sovereignty and indepen-
dence of the Navajo Nation as a whole, as well as an increasing freedom of
the tribe to manage its own affairs without federal interference." In any
event, the early reluctance of the Navajo tribal courts to openly apply custom
was not apparently due to any lack of statutory authority."
Until 1985, the Code required the courts to apply, in all civil cases,
customs not prohibited by federal statute." Cases to which both federal law
and tribal customary law were inapplicable were to be governed by state
law?3 With the passage of an amended Judicial Code in 1985, the courts
were granted even greater authority to apply custom. First, custom not
prohibited by federal law was to be applied in all, not just civil, cases . '
Second, the application of state law was made entirely optional and remained
subordinate to both federal and tribal law.35 These amendments, while
leaving essentially unchanged the authority of the Navajo courts to make use
of custom, nonetheless appeared to catalyze new efforts by the courts to
develop and employ tribal customary law.36
The Tribal Code contains other significant provisions as well." For
example, under title 8, courts are required to apply custom "in the determina-
30. Recent federal policy towards Indians has emphasized tribal self-determination. See, e.g.,
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1974,25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988).
31. See Conn, supra note 3, at 368-70 (noting the difficulties faced by the Navajo Nation
in attempting to apply customary law while simultaneously establishing an Anglo-style court
system). It should be noted that while the Navajo courts did not apply customary law as freely
as they currently do, the record demonstrates that even during the periods of strictest federal
oversight the Navajo judges were able to sometimes covertly use Navajo common law. See
Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6049, 6050
(Navajo 1991); Paul E. Frye, Lender Recourse in Indian Country: A Navajo Case Study, 21 N.M.
L. REV. 275, 304 (1991).
32. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 7, § 204(a) (1977).
33. Id. § 204(c).
34. See supra note 28.
35. See supra note 28.
36. Note, for example, the growing number since 1985 of Navajo Nation Supreme Court
rulings making use of common law. See the appendix following this comment.
37. Beyond the statutory provisions dealing with probate and judicial qualifications, Navajo
common law is also emphasized elsewhere in the Navajo Tribal Code. For example, the preamble
to the Navajo Nation Corporate Code instructs courts to "give the utmost respect in deciding the
meaning and purpose of this code to the unique traditions and customs of the Navajo People."
NAvAJo NAON CORP. CODE 2, Navajo Tribal Council Res. PJA-1-86 (Jan. 29, 1986) as
amended by CD-61-86 (Dec. 11, 1986).
In 1991, the Navajo courts themselves promulgated a Code of Judicial Conduct which places
great emphasis on the foundation ofjudicial ethics in Navajo tradition. See Tso, Moral Principles,




tion of heirs" when such custom is proved. 8 This provision reflects the fact
that custom initially was applied by courts predominantly in probate
matters. 9 The Code also requires that all judicial appointments to the Navajo
courts be members of the Navajo tribe, able to speak Navajo, and "have some
knowledge of Navajo culture and tradition."' Applicants for judgeships must
also demonstrate understanding of the clan system and religious ceremonies,
and appreciate "the traditional Navajo lifestyle."'"
B. The Status of Custom in Navajo Law
In addition to the statutory provisions requiring use of customs and
traditions by the courts, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has recently been
emphasizing that Navajo common law is the "law of preference" in the
Navajo Nation.4" The practical effect of this policy has been to put lawyers,
judges, and parties on notice that custom and tradition, if pleaded and
demonstrated, will be given great weight on appeal. The policy has also
confirmed the intention of the supreme court to take judicial notice of Navajo
common law where it can.43 It is not clear, however, whether the policy has
yet significantly affected the frequency with which Navajo common law is
raised by parties.
Certain Navajo customs also constitute the equivalent of an unwritten tribal
constitution, according to a 1990 decision of the Navajo Nation Supreme
38. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 8, § 2(b) (Supp. 1984-85).
39. See the appendix following this comment (three of seven decisions prior to 1979
involved probate matters).
40. NAVAJO TRiB. CODE tit. 7, § 354 (Supp. 1984-85). Navajo Nation President Peterson
Zah at one time advocated testing to ensure that all practitioners of law in the Navajo courts be
able to speak Navajo. 2 VICENTI, supra note 16, at 255-56.
41. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 7, § 354(5) (Supp. 1984-85). The established advocate program
of the Navajo Nation Bar Association, by allowing Navajos who lack law school education to
practice in the tribal courts, serves similar goals. As the supreme court has noted, "An
understanding of the Navajo life-style and culture is indispensable to the practice of law within
the Navajo Nation, and Navajo advocates advance the development of a modem judicial system
which retains traditional norms." Tafoya v. Navajo Nation Bar Ass'n, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6120, 6121 (Navajo 1989); see also Tso, Process, supra note 1,
at 229 (discussing role of Navajo advocates).
42. See Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6049, 6050 (Navajo 1991); Austin, supra note 10, at 7.
43. See, e.g., Sells v. Sells, 5 Navajo Rptr. 104, 108 (Navajo 1986) ("The soul of this Court
is to apply Navajo Tribal law, especially where our custom and tradition are appropriate.").
44. Keeping track of the frequency with which custom is pleaded is difficult in part because,
to the author's knowledge, no comprehensive studies have been conducted of the unpublished
opinions of the Navajo trial courts. Furthermore, only a fraction of cases brought before the tribal
courts are appealed to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, and the court itself is consequently
unable to keep track of such information except through informal communications with trial-level
judges.
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Court. In Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors,45 the court
explained:
the Navajo word for "law" is beehaz'aanii. While we hear that
word popularly used in the sense of laws enacted by the Navajo
Nation Council. .... it actually refers to a higher law. It means
something which is "way at the top"; something written in stone
so to speak; something which is absolutely there; and, something
like the Anglo concept of natural law.'
Customs and traditions that are "fundamental and basic to Navajo life and
society" are included within the beehaz'aanii.47 The court has indicated that
individual rights to political liberty, marriage, association with relatives, and
fair employment opportunities, along with "rights retained by the people," are
part of the beehaz'aanii." So far, no other Navajo customs have been
assigned this special status by the courts.
The power of the beehaz'aanii is sufficient to "set the boundaries for
permissible governmental action by the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the Navajo Nation."'49 Thus, Navajo common law in some
instances will presumably prevail over all other sources of law, including
Tribal Council legislation.'
C. What is "Custom"?
Although Navajo courts have employed custom in their decisions at least
as far back as 1969, when opinions began to be published," it was not until
1982 that any court attempted to define "custom." Then, in Lente v. Notah,52
the Navajo Court of Appeals explored for the first and only time the
characteristics of a "custom" and acknowledged the problems intrinsic to
relying on custom to legally resolve disputes. 3 While explicitly declining to
adopt any particular definition of "custom," the court cited to various
45. 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6009 (Navajo 1990).
46. Id at 6011.
47. Id
48. 1d; Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6113 (Navajo 1990). See infra notes 351-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of fundamental rights.
49. Bennett, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6011.
50. It should be noted that the Navajo Nation, unlike many tribes, does not have a written
constitution.
51. See, e.g., In re Trust of Benally, 1 Navajo Rptr. 10, 12 (Navajo Ct. App. 1969)
(acknowledging that decedents property "belonged to his wife and children living with him at
the time of his death according to Tribal custom"); see also In re Marriage of Daw, I Navajo
Rptr. 1, 3-4 (Navajo Ct. App. 1969) (upholding customary marriage under tribal statute, even
though no marriage license had been obtained).
52. 3 Navajo Rptr. 72 (Navajo Ct. App. 1982).




anthropological sources indicating that, at a minimum, a custom must be a
practice and not solely a beliefY More than this, the court would not say,
indicating only that any definition of "custom" should be the product of a
more complete study of the issue."
The court did, however, point out the dangers inherent in any attempt to
ascertain a particular custom and apply it in the courts: (1) custom could vary
throughout the Navajo Nation; (2) the existence and proper application of a
custom could be disputed; and (3) traditions could fall out of use to an extent
that they could no longer be considered custom.' Interestingly, the court also
expressed concern that the parties to a dispute might not recognize an
otherwise applicable customY This latter issue has not surfaced in any
published opinion since Lente, the court apparently having decided that
subjective recognition of custom by the parties is irrelevant to the question of
whether and how custom should be applied.58 With regard to all of the
potential pitfalls in trying to use custom in the courts, the court concluded
only that courts should determine whether "a particular custom or tradition is
generally accepted and applicable to the parties before the court.'59 The
mechanisms for making such determinations were laid out in subsequent
decisions, as discussed below.
D. Raising and Proving Custom in the Courts
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court did not return to the question of proper
use of customary law until 1987.' Immediately after the court of appeals
54. Id. at 80. The court of appeals took note that custom had been defined as "practice and
not an opinion"; "what men do, not what they think"; and "the practice or regular conduct of
members of a group of people, acting in a certain way." Id. (citations omitted).
55. I The court noted that such a study was currently being undertaken by the Navajo
courts, apparently referring to the Navajo Common Law Project begun in 1982. Id See supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Project.
56. I at 79-80. These peculiar difficulties in applying tribal traditional law have been noted
by commentators. See, e.g., Brandfon, supra note 1, at 1014.
57. Lente, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 80. The court noted that "[ojld customs and practices may be
followed by the individuals involved in a case or not." Id.'
58. Although the court has never revisited the issue, it did quote Lente in a recent decision
emphasizing that claims made under Navajo custom must be particularly scrutinized. Hood v.
Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6061, 6063 (Navajo 1991).
Despite its acknowledgment of the various warnings given in Lente, however, the court in Hood
did not emphasize nor even specifically address the "subjective recognition" aspect of the 1982
decision,
59. Lente, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 80. The court also noted that "the application of custom
depends on a good many circumstances and all the facts of the case." Id. at 81. On the facts of
Lente itself, involving a child custody dispute, the court upheld the trial court's decision to award
custody to the child's father, even though strict Navajo custom mandated that children go with
their mother in the event of a divorce, I. The court found that the trial court was not bound to
"strictly follow custom and tradition," so long as it had "carefully determined all the facts and
circumstances before making a ruling." Id.
60. See In re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie, 5 Navajo Rptr. 161 (Navajo 1987). For treatment
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handed down Lente v. Notah in 1982, however, Judge Tom Tso, later to
become Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, issued a series of
influential decisions from the Window Rock District Court bearing on the
problems of raising and proving Navajo custom in the courts."
1. The Pleading Requirement
The first of these decisions, Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance
Co.,' concerned a dispute over whether a divorce decree terminated a
Navajo woman's right to the proceeds from her former spouse's life insurance
policy, regardless of the contract's terms.' Judge Tso found no applicable
federal law and, under title 7, section 204 of the Navajo Tribal Code, applied
Navajo customary law over Arizona state law."
Tso held that because the plaintiff had alleged a violation of Navajo
tradition in the complaint, customary law came into play.' The hesitancy
expressed by the court of appeals in Lente, decided almost four months
earlier, towards applying customary law without regard for the parties'
subjective recognition of the particular custom was apparently replaced in
Apache with an assumption that custom, if properly pleaded, was applicable
to all civil cases.'
The pleading requirement was confirmed by the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court five years later in In re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie.' Furthermore, the
court in Belone held that if a unique local custom was to be relied upon, the
pleading had to so state.' The requirement that an intention to rely on
of this key case, see infra notes 74-126 and accompanying text.
61. In re Interest of J.J.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983); In re Estate
of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983); Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4
Navajo Rptr. 159 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983); Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3
Navajo Rptr. 250 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
62. 3 Navajo Rptr. 250 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
63. Id. at 250. Boyd Apache had designated his wife, Rebecca Jane Apache, as a beneficiary
of the life insurance policy provided him as an employee of the Navajo Nation. Id. The couple
separated, and Rebecca Jane then obtained a divorce by default. Id. The insurance policy was
not addressed in the divorce decree. Id. Shortly thereafter, Boyd died in an automobile accident,
Id.
64. Id. at 251.
65. Id. In their petition for an injunction to prevent payment of the insurance proceeds,
Boyd's sister and mother claimed: "That by Navajo tradition, Rebecca Apache upon divorce to
Boyd Apache relinquished all rights and title to his property, and upon the final decree of divorce
as a single unmarried person having no claim or right to the estate or insurance of Boyd Apache."
Id. "This allegation adequately and properly put the opposing parties on notice that Navajo
custom would be relied upon as applicable law." Id.
66. See id.; Lente v. Notab, 3 Navajo Rptr. 72, 80 (Navajo Ct. App. 1982).
67. 5 Navajo Rptr. 161 (Navajo 1987). The court held that "[w]here a claim relies on Navajo
custom, the custom must be alleged, and the pleading must state generally how that custom




custom be announced in the pleading was based on the due process rights of
the opposing party and the need for the court to be on notice that custom
might be applied.69 Like the district court in Apache, the court made no
mention of Lente's expressed concerns with the subjective recognition by the
parties of the applicability of a particular custom.70
2. Proving the Existence of a Custom
Judge Tso's seminal decisions in 1982 and 1983 were especially significant
for establishing the permissible methods of demonstrating the existence of
applicable custom. In Apache, Tso noted that expert testimony needed to be
used only when a custom's existence was in doubt,7' that judicial notice could
be taken of customary law generally known within the community, and that
custom could be found from "accurate sources."' Several months later, in
Tome v. Navajo Nation,' Tso reiterated the holding of Apache, adding that
custom could be applied upon "proof' of its existence.74
Later in 1983, in In re Estate of Apachee,75 Tso set forth a comprehensive
description of the ways custom could be demonstrated in the courts. 6
Custom could be found through testimony of the parties, judicial notice,
expert testimony, other evidence, precedent in the courts, or "some learned
treatises on Navajo ways."' This list was reaffirmed shortly thereafter in the
last of Tso's formative district court decisions, In re J.J.S."
In the 1987 Belone decision, authored by then-recently appointed Chief
Justice Tso, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court adopted the Apachee list
almost verbatim.' The court held that parties could prove the existence of
applicable Navajo common law through: (1) recorded precedent of the Navajo
courts; (2) learned treatises on the Navajo way; (3) judicial notice; or (4)
expert testimony."0 Significantly, the court omitted testimony and other
evidence offered by the parties themselves, another indication of the court's
apparent intention to objectify Navajo customary law rather than to rely on the
69. Id. On the facts of Belone, the court held that, because the appellee had not alleged a
violation of Navajo custom until trial, she could not seek relief under Navajo customary law. Id.
The court went on, however, to discuss the applicable custom "for purposes of guidance." lId
70. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
71. Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250, 251 (Window Rock Dist.
Ct. 1982).
72. Id. at 252.
73. 4 Navajo Rptr. 159 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
74. Id. at 161.
75. 4 Navajo Rptr. 178 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
76. Id. at 179-81.
77. Id. at 179-80. For a more complete discussion of some of the methods on Judge Tso's
list, see infra notes 82-127 and accompanying text.
78. 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 193 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
79. In re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie, 5 Navajo Rptr. 161, 165 (Navajo 1987).
80. Id,
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expectations and perceptions of the parties.8 Belone remains the governing
authority on permissible methods of demonstrating Navajo custom in the
courts.
a) Recorded Precedent
The principle of stare decisis appears to govern Navajo jurisprudence to the
same extent as it influences American state and federal courts.' Navajo
common law decisions are no exception to the rule - indeed, common law
precedent is cited frequently by the courts, especially when a traditional value
or moral precept is relevant.' Note, however, the requirement that precedent
be recorded; the courts do not (because they cannot) cite to cases decided
before 1969, when written opinions first began to be collected in the Navajo
Reporter.'
b) Learned Treatises
While the Navajo courts make frequent use of anthropological, sociologi-
cal, legal, and other studies to establish the existence of Navajo customs,
generally such sources are employed as corroborative evidence only." There
is an apparent distrust on the part of the courts for the accuracy of Navajo
studies, especially those written by non-Navajos.' Judge Tso, in Apachee,
explained this aversion as due to a feeling that studies of the Navajo are often
"incomplete, inaccurate or do not reflect the current state of the Navajo
common law."" Tso indicated that, therefore, the most reliable studies would
81. See supra note 57-58 and accompanying text.
82. As time passes and the body of tribal jurisprudence grows, the Navajo courts cite more
and more often to prior decisions. See the appendix following this comment.
83. See, e.g., In re Estate of Begay #2, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6130, 6131-32 (Navajo 1992) (citing numerous prior decisions developing the Navajo
common law right to due process); Alonzo v. Martine, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 6129, 6129 (Navajo 1991) (relying on prior decisions applying the Navajo
common law of respect for children). In nearly half of the decisions developing or making use
of Navajo common law, the courts have cited to Navajo precedent. In a few cases, non-Navajo
jurisprudence has been employed as well. See the appendix following this comment.
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6112 (Navajo 1990) (citing to prior case law as well
as anthropological source to establish invalidity of employer's anti-nepotism rule in light of
Navajo common law kinship obligations); In re JJ.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 193-95 (Window Rock
Dist. Ct. 1983) (citing opinion of solicitor to Navajo Court of Appeals, as well as various
sociological and anthropological sources to set out Navajo common law of adoption). But see In
re Marriage of Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6113, 6115
(Navajo 1989) (citing solely to anthropological/historical work to support finding that Anglo-style
common-law marriage was not sanctioned under Navajo common law).
86. See, e.g., In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 180 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.





be those by "wise and experienced Navajo authors."'
The range of written sources the courts have consulted is wide. In 1982's
Lente v. Notah,"9 the first Navajo decision to explicitly cite to Navajo studies,
the court of appeals made use of two general jurisprudential works to attempt
to define "custom,"' and two volumes by noted (non-Navajo) anthropologists
to support the ideas that relatives have always been especially important to
Navajo children and that the children would remain with the mother in a
traditional divorce.91 Since Lente, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has
cited to an anthropological work on only two other occasions. In a 1989
decision, In re Marriage of Francisco,' the court supported its holding that
Navajo custom did not recognize common law marriages with a reference to
Raymond Friday Locke's The Book of the Navajo 3 In 1990, the court cited
to an anthropological source to support its finding that traditional Navajo
notions of kinship operated to invalidate an overly broad anti-nepotism policy
instituted by a public services company on the Navajo reservation.'
More frequent references to Navajo and other studies have been made by
the district courts. Judge Tso, during his tenure on the Window Rock District
Court during the early 1980s, referenced psychological studies, texts on
American law, sociological analyses, anthropological works, treatises on
English common law, articles discussing Navajo customary law itself, court
of appeals solicitor opinions, and Navajo government and social services
publications.9 Similar references have been made by the Crownpoint District
Court, under Judge Marie Neswood, 6 and by Judge (currently Chief Justice)
Robert Yazzie when he presided over the Window Rock District Court in the
mid- and late-1980s.'
c) Judicial Notice
By far the predominant means of establishing Navajo customary or
common law in the courts has been through the doctrine of judicial notice.98
88. Id.
89. 3 Navajo Rptr. 72 (Navajo Ct.-App. 1982).
90. Id. at 80 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (1921);
EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW (1953)).
91. Id. at 80-81 (citing CLYDE KLUCKHOHN & DOROTHEA LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO (1946);
GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE (1975)).
92. 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6113 (Navajo 1989).
93. Id. at 6115.
94. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6112 (Navajo 1990).
95. See In re U.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 194-95 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983); In re Estate
of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 182-84 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982); Apache v. Rupublic
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250, 251-52 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
96. In re Interest of D.P., 3 Navajo Rptr. 255, 257 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 1982).
97. See Estate of Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209,211-13 (Window Rock Dist.
Ct. 1986).
98. More than two-thirds of the published decisions employing or explaining Navajo
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This trend is most likely explained by the failure of parties to present
evidence going to the existence of custom, as well as by the efforts of the
courts to establish a body of precedential customary law and to encourage use
of that law."
The doctrinal foundations for judicial notice of Navajo common law were
laid by Judge Tso when he was on the Window Rock District Court. In the
1983 decision, Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.,"0 Tso took
judicial notice of traditional Navajo law severing all property ties between
former spouses.' Tso then used that law to support his holding that the
complainant had no right to the proceeds of her former husband's life
insurance policy, regardless of the fact that she had never been dropped as a
beneficiary - an example of how tribal common law can depart from basic
tenets of Anglo-American law."° Tso emphasized the duty of trial court
judges to take judicial notice of customary law that is generally known or can
be found from "accurate sources."'"4 In a statement that was later to be
adopted by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Tso indicated that the standard
for judicial notice of Navajo common law was whether "every damn fool
knows" the custom." A few months later, in Tome v. Navajo Nation,"4
Tso tool judicial notice of the Navajo customary law that assets connected
with land were the property of the Navajo Nation, not individuals, and that
therefore the district court had a duty to act as guardian of a Navajo
newspaper and publishing business."0
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Tso, gave its endorsement to use of judicial notice in In re Estate of Belone
common law involve judicial notice. See the appendix following this comment.
99. See the appendix following this comment (showing infrequency of use of expert
witnesses to prove common law and predominance of judicial notice as means of finding law).
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
100. 3 Navajo Rptr. 250 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
101. Id. at 252-53.
102. Id. at 253. The district court noted that its holding was "not offensive to any sense of
Anglo-European justice." Id. (citing New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F.2d 665,
667 (2d Cir. 1939) (noting that the English-American law regarding the continuing interest of an
ex-spouse in one's life insurance policy was "very ancient and still prevails")). There is no
disputing the fact, however, that plain disregard of a life insurance contract's terms with regard
to who is the named beneficiary, absent special circumstances, is the product of a uniquely
Navajo public policy concern. See generally 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1714 (1982).
103. Apache, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 252.
104. Id. (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF Ti LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 329, at 761 n.25 (2d ed. 1972)). Tso appears to have misconstrued Cleary's view of
the "every damn fool" aphorism, which was that the phrase was clearly an exaggeration. CLEARY,
supra, § 329, at 761 n.25. In practice, the Navajo courts have not interpreted the standard strictly,
instead following the more flexible criteria for taking judicial notice. See infra notes 110-13 and
accompanying text.
105. 4 Navajo Rptr. 159 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).




v. Yazzie07 in 1987. While explicitly citing the Apache conclusion that
"judicial notice may only be taken of those facts every damn fool knows," the
court took care to clarify that this aphorism was not to be taken literally.'
The actual test, the court indicated, was whether "a custom is generally known
within the community, or... capable of accurate determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."" 9
In practice, since Belone the court has never made an effort to establish in
the record that judicially noticed customary law is "generally known," and the
"accurate" sources it has relied on have been primarily legal, sociological, or
anthropological treatises or, more often, the court's own expert knowledge."
0
Usually, the court has taken judicial notice of and applied Navajo common
law on its own initiative, without paying particular attention to whether
common law was pleaded by the parties or relied upon by the trial court."'
With regard to the latter situation, however, the court in Belone emphasized
the need for district court judges taking judicial notice of customs to "clearly
set forth" those customs in their opinions so that the evidence for the
existence of the customs could be reviewed on appeal."2 In sum, judicial
notice - especially by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court - appears to be
the most important, and least standardized, means of establishing Navajo
common law."3
d) Expert Testimony
Although Judge Tso mentioned in his 1983 district court decisions the
possibility of establishing Navajo common law through expert testimony,"'
the preeminent and authoritative opinion on the issue was given by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court in the 1987 opinion, In re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie.
In Belone, the court undertook an exhaustive examination of the procedural
requirements for making use of expert witness testimony to prove the
existence of customary law."' Following is a schematic of the "guidelines"
set out by the court in that decision:
(1) Qualifications: The trial court must accept the witness's expert status,
107. In re Estate of Belone v. Yazzie, 5 Navajo Rptr. 161, 165 (Navajo 1987).
108. Id. (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 329 (3d ed. 1984)).
109. Id.
110. See the appendix following this comment.
111. See, e.g., Alonzo v. Martine, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6129, 6129 (Navajo 1991); Boos v. Yazzie, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6115, 6116 (Navajo 1990).
112. Belone, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 165-66.
113. It should be noted that judges are accorded considerable discretion under the Anglo-
American judicial notice doctrine as well, and that this is viewed as necessary for reasons of
convenience and expediency. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 14-26 (1967).
114. In re Interest of JJ.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 193 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983); In re
Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 180 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
115. Belone, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 166-67.
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based on evidence of the witness's specialized knowledge or understand-
ing. 6 This evidence may include:
(a) the witness's reading;
(b) the witness's practice of custom; or
(c) the witness's understanding of custom, based on: (i) oral education; (ii)
adherence to a traditional way of life; (iii) a long-term interest in Navajo
custom; or (iv) community status as a person knowledgeable of Navajo
custom.
17
(2) Relevance: The trial court must assess whether the expert's skill,
knowledge, or experience is likely to be helpful in determining the existence
of custom relevant to resolving the dispute."'
(3) Necessity: The expert's testimony must be drawn from knowledge that
either:
(a) is so specialized that the lay person could not understand it;"9 or
(b) will help the jurors' comprehension of custom about which they may
have general knowledge."
(4) Discretion: The expert's testimony may be excluded if the trial court
believes that:
(a) a reasonable opinion cannot possibly be offered about the existence of
a particular custom; or
(b) the offered opinion is insufficiently grounded in fact.'
Beyond these guidelines, the court in Belone held that a trial court should
116. Id at 167.
117. I.
118. I. at 166.
119. I. The court phrased, the requirement to be that the expert's knowledge "is so
specialized as to be beyond the understanding of laymen." Id. Clearly, this standard cannot be
construed literally - an expert would hardly be of any use where a custom was inherently
incomprehensible to the trier of fact. The court may have intended that the requirement be that
a lay person would require expert testimony to understand a particular custom.
120. Id. Presumably, this provision would apply to judges as well as jurors. See NAVAJO
TRIB. CODE tit. 7, § 204(b) (Supp. 1984-85) (providing that "the court may request the advice of
counsellors familiar with ... customs and usages").
Strangely, the court noted that "some jurisdictions" would allow the more lenient (3)(b)
standard of necessity. Belone, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 166. If the court intended to permit this standard
to apply throughout the Navajo Nation (and it seems irrational to allow district courts to
determine which standard they prefer), then the "beyond the understanding" criterion of (3)(a)
becomes meaningless because any finding of admissibility under (3)(a) would necessarily result
in a similar finding under (3)(b). As there are no obvious reasons to hold to the stricter standard
of necessity, the court should do away with it entirely and instead adopt the (3)(b) standard. See
also NAVAJO TRit. CODE it. 7, § 204(b) (Supp. 1984-85) (allowing use of expert "counsellors"
where "any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Navajo Nation").
121. Belone, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 166 (citing CLEARY, supra note 108, § 13, at 33, 34).
Although the expert's testimony must be grounded in fact, "the witness can draw inferences from
facts that the trier of fact would not be competent to draw." Id. at 167. Note that the basis for




hold an informal pretrial conference with "two or three" appointed expert
witnesses when there is any doubt about the existence or nature of a custom
that could determine the dispute's outcome." While they could attend this
conference and question the experts, parties apparently could not offer their
own testimony." The court noted that the experts might then, in traditional
Navajo fashion, arrive at a consensus about the custom.'"
The court admitted that district courts, while bound to abide by the
guidelines set out in Belone, ultimately had discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding Navajo customs.'" On review,
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court could only overturn an abuse of discretion
or a failure to follow the procedural steps for evaluating the admissibility of
expert testimony."
An analysis of the published decisions indicates that expert testimony on
tribal common law has been acknowledged by the Navajo courts in only four
decisions."7 Whether or not this small number reflects the true incidence of
the use of experts is unclear.
III. Criminal Law
It is perhaps not surprising that Navajo common law has been employed
by the tribal courts much less frequently in criminal than in civil cases."
The reasons for this disparity are undoubtedly several: the Navajo criminal
code is comprehensive, closely tracking the 1962 Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute;' while the criminal case load of the courts is
large,'30 the number of criminal appeals is not;'3' and all "major crimes"
are tried under federal law in federal courts.' 2 The Navajo Nation Supreme
122. Id.
123. Id. ("The parties and their counsels may attend, but their participation should be limited
to asking questions to clarify the expert witnesses' conclusions.").
124. Id. ("This is the way Navajos have traditionally clarified their understanding of customs,
and it is more appropriate than the adversarial system where each party tries to interpret custom
to benefit its own interests.").
125. Id.
126. Id. The court did not establish any standard for gauging when an abuse of discretion
has occurred.
127. See the appendix following this comment.
128. See the appendix following this comment.
129. Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6049,
6051 (Navajo 1991) (Tso, J., concurring). The Navajo criminal code is contained in title 17 of
the Navajo Tribal Code.
130. Of the approximately 67,000 cases heard by the Navajo courts in 1990, 80% to 85%
were criminal. REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
131. For example, during the first three months of 1992, seventeen civil appeals were filed,
in contrast to only three criminal appeals. Id. at 13-14. During the same period, however, 6,328
criminal cases were filed, but only 304 civil cases. Id. at 72.
132. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). Major crimes include murder,
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Court, however, has recently hinted at an interest in developing the use of
Navajo common law to resolve criminal matters,"' and it remains to be seen
whether that interest will manifest itself in a growing body of case law."
Below are discussions of the areas of criminal law in which the Navajo
courts have looked to tribal custom. Note that the common law rights of
criminal defendants are discussed in a later section,3 ' as are traditional
remedies and punishments for crimes."
A. Specific Crimes
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court in its common law decisions has only
pointed to one form of traditional crime - the corruption of a government
official. [n Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Sr.,37 a 1991 decision, the court
heard an appeal from Peter MacDonald, Sr., the former Chairman of the
Navajo Nation whose conviction in the tribal courts in 1990 on various
charges of bribery, conflicts of interest, and conspiracy garnered widespread
attention. MacDonald argued on appeal that the imposition of consecutive
sentences for his crimes was cruel and unusual punishment.3 ' The court
disagreed, and elaborated on the traditional attitudes of Navajos towards
government corruption: "Official corruption in public office is a serious
offense, because it robs the Navajo people of their property. Even more
seriously, using Navajo culture, it robs the Navajo people of their dignity.' 39
In the only other decision discussing a common law crime, the Tuba City
District Court, in a 1990 opinion addressing civil claims arising from a sexual
assault, recognized traditional Navajo notions about rape." The court noted




manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault resulting
in serious bodily injury, burglary, robbery, and other felonies. Id.
133. See Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6050.
134. The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the right of Indian tribes to use
customary law in criminal cases. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1978). The
court in Wheeler noted that
Indian tribes are "distinct political communities" with their own mores and laws,
which can be enforced by formal criminal proceedings in tribal courts as well as
by less formal means. They have a significant interest in maintaining orderly
relations among their members and in preserving tribal customs and traditions
.... Tribal laws and procedures are often influenced by tribal custom and can
differ greatly from our own.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
135. See infra notes 318-75 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 426-41 and accompanying text.
137. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6053 (Navajo 1991).
138. Ia. at 6053-54.
139. Ia. at 6059.
140. Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoima, No. TC-CV-344-84, slip op. at 2-4 (Tuba City Dist.
Ct. Apr. 9, 1990) (Kuwanhyoima 1).




Finally, a 1983 opinion of the solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court addressed the crime of disturbing graves."" While most of the opinion
dwells on the construction of a tribal statute and American law, the solicitor
noted that
[t]here is a strong policy in Navajo common law against any
disturbance of any grave, although I am advised that some
disturbances of graves by medicinemen for proper religious
purposes may be permissible under Navajo common law where
such a disturbance is considered necessary and proper for a proper
ceremonial, in the opinion of the medicineman. This case will of
course have to remain for a proper determination in a case before
the court.143
B. Defenses
Criminal defenses under Navajo common law were addressed by the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court in 1991 in Navajo Nation v. Platero.'4 In
Platero, the court considered a defendant who used force while mistakenly
believing that he was acting as a police officer.14 Such an honest mistake,
the court ruled, was enough to exonerate the defendant .from criminal
charges."4 The court also noted that Navajos traditionally did not take
measures against an offender unless the criminal act was "willful or
intentional."'47 These defenses to criminal charges were tied, the court
explained, to the traditional aversion to punishment and coercion in Navajo
society. 4 Furthermore, the court appeared to hold that the elements of
willfulness and the absence of mistake must be borne as part of the
prosecution's burden of proof.49
C. Juveniles
The Navajo courts have employed common law in at least two criminal
cases involving minors. In 1982, Judge Marie Neswood of the Crownpoint
District Court found that, under Navajo common law, restitution was a
and public policy of the Navajo People, as shown by the customs and traditions."). The district
court also noted that sexually assaulted women were entitled to "fair compensation" under Navajo
common law, see infra notes 387-88 and accompanying text, and that no interspousal immunity
existed for such assaults. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
142. Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal Courts, No. 83-6 (1983).
143. Id. at 3.
144. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6049 (Navajo 1991).
145. Id. at 6050-51. The defendant had apparently not yet received his termination notice




149. See id. at 6050-51.
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fundamental means of redressing criminal offenses, and that juvenile offenders
should be presumptively required to provide such" restitution to victims.'"
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court in In re A.W, a 1988 decision, held
that juvenile criminal offenders were protected by Navajo common law due
process to the same extent as were adults."
IV. Family Law
By far, family law occupies the bulk of the Navajo court decisions
applying Navajo common law." Issues involving children, marriage, and
divorce are especially amenable to resolution by traditional law - largely
because the common law in this area is more completely developed and
recognized by the courts than in others, but perhaps also because the courts
are more concerned with retaining traditions in the context of the home and
the family than, say, in dealing with crimes or contract disputes."
The Navajo courts have time and again emphasized the central role that
families and clans play in traditional Navajo culture. The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court recently noted that kinship among the Navajos is much more
deeply felt and complicated than it is among Americans generally. 5' In a
1983 decision of the Window Rock District Court, Judge Tom Tso explained
the importance of family and clan in Navajo tradition:
It must also be understood that the Navajo clan system is very
important, with a child being of the mother's clan and "born for"
the father's clan. The clan is important, and the family as an
economic unit is vital. The Navajo live together in family groups
which can include parents, children, grandparents, brothers and
sisters, and all the members of the family group have important
duties to each other. These duties are based on the need to
survive and upon very important religious values which command
each to support each other and the group."
150. In re Interest of D.P., 3 Navajo Rptr. 255, 257 (Cr9wnpoint Dist. Ct. 1982).
151. 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6041 (Navajo 1988).
152. Id. at 6043 ("Navajo customary due process applies in juvenile proceedings to the same
extent as applied in adult proceedings.").
153. Sen the appendix following this comment.
154. Set? Billie v. Abbott, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6021, 6024
(Navajo 1988) ("Navajo domestic relations, such as divorce or child support, is an area where
Navajo traditions are the strongest.").
155. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6112 (Navajo 1990).
156. In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 182 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983). Chief
Justice Emeritus Tso recently noted that
[t]he clan system is in fact a legal system where rights and responsibilities are
enforced by clan members. A legal concept that comes from this system is that





The special treatment of children by the Navajo courts is apparent in the
case law. Wherever children are involved in or affected by the dispute, the
courts go to great lengths to ensure that the children's interests are considered
carefully.'" The Navajo Nation Supreme Court explained this attention in
Alonzo v. Martine,' a 1991 decision dealing with retroactive child support.
Citing to various precedents, the court noted that "Navajos do not view
children as property or possessions, but value them as individuals in a
community."'59 Furthermore, "[t]here is a fundamental Navajo belief that
children are wanted and must not be mistreated in any way."'" These tenets,
emphasizing the duty of care and respect owed to Navajo children by the
courts, run through all of the decisions involving children.
Note that this comment discusses common law juvenile criminal offenses
in the section on criminal law;6 child custody and support in the below
subsection on divorce; and the rights of children in the section on
rights.'o
1. Adoption
The Navajo common law concerning adoption illustrates the degree to
which Navajo and Anglo-American law can diverge. The seminal opinion on
the subject is In re Interest of J.J.S.,'6 a 1983 decision issued by Judge Tom
Tso of the Window Rock District Court. Tso first pointed out that the notions
of adoption stemmed from different sources in Navajo and Anglo law. While
Anglo law was concerned "with the termination of parental rights or creating
a legalistic parent and child relationship," Navajo common law on adoption
was premised on the traditional cultural precept that children belong to more
than just the parents." Extended families and clans had an obligation to
care for children whose parents were unable to do so."
that. . . . There are even relations and obligations to mountains, plants and
animals, Mother Earth, and all of creation.
Tso, Moral Principles, supra note 16, at 17.
157. See, e.g., Nez v. Nez, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6123,
6124-25 (Navajo 1992) (remanding divorce decree for findings of fact that best interests of
children were considered, as required by Navajo common law).
158. 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6129 (Navajo 1991).
159. Id. at 6129.
160. Id. (citing In re Interest of J.J.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 194 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.
1983)).
161. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 219-34 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
164. 4 Navajo Rptr. 192 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
165. Id. at 195.
166. Id
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
The correct statement of the Navajo Common Law of adoption is
that there is an obligation in family members, usually aunts or
grandparents or [other] family member[s], who are best suited to
... support and assist children in need by taking care of them for
such periods of time as are necessary under the circumstances, or
permanently in the case of a permanent tragedy effecting [sic] the
parents.... The mechanism is informal and practical and based
upon community expectation founded in religious and cultural
belief.67
To summarize J.J.S.: (1) the obligation under Navajo common law to care for
children is shared by the parents as well as the extended family and clan;
(2) adoption itself, therefore, is essentially an assumption of primary care
duties by the children's relatives when the parents are unable to perform those
duties; 6 and (3) adoption may be either permanent or temporary, as the
need may be. 7 ' Note, however, that these holdings have never been
addressed by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.'
2. Paternity
The interests of children are preeminent in paternity disputes settled by
Navajo common law." The straightforward rule, stated by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court in 1987 in Davis v. Davis, is that "a child born during
a marriage is considered the issue of that marriage."'7 This rule is based on
the Navtjo common law concern that children have an identifiable father to
support and care for them.7  The courts have not yet determined whether
there is common law applicable to paternity suits involving children born out
of wedlcck.
B. Marriage
Just as children hold special status under Navajo common law, so do issues





171. The solicitor to the Navajo Court of Appeals in 1983 issued an opinion regarding the
Navajo common law of adoption. Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal Courts, No. 83-10 (Sept. 19, 1983).
The opinicn comes to the same conclusions as'those in J.JS. See id.
172. S ee Davis v. Davis, 5 Navajo Rptr. 169, 171 (Navajo 1987) (noting that the Navajo
common law presumption "that a child born during a marriage is... the issue of that marriage
... was developed to protect the child from the disabilities attached to the status of illegitima-
cy.").
173. d.





by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court: "Traditional Navajo society placed
great importance upon the institution of marriage. A traditional Navajo
marriage, when consummated according to a prescribed elaborate ritual, is
believed to be blessed by the 'Holy People.' This blessing insure[s] that the
marriage will be stable, in harmony, and perpetual."'75 The right to marriage
has been deemed by the court to be "fundamental."'76 The decisions dealing
with marriage-related issues, therefore, reflect these deep-seated attitudes
towards the importance of the cultural institution.
1. Customary Marriage
Marriages in the Navajo Nation have been governed by tribal statute since
1954, when the Tribal Council passed legislation instructing courts to validate
traditional Navajo marriages occurring on or before January 31, 1954."7 The
statute was passed, apparently, to ensure that Navajos would from then on
obtain marriage licenses and thereby avoid problems in obtaining government
benefits for their dependents." The Tribal Council's action set the stage for
the inevitable day when the court would be faced with a plea to validate a
customary marriage that had occurred after the deadline.
The first recorded opinion in the Navajo Reporter, a 1969 court of appeals
decision, deals with exactly this problem." In In re Marriage of Daw, the
court circumvented the 1954 statute by holding that a customary marriage that
had occurred in 1964 was also a "common law" marriage, that the latter was
not specifically prohibited, and that therefore the court could validate the
appellants' marriage." The court reaffirmed Daw ten years later in In re
Marriage of Ketchum,8' holding that "any marriage contracted by tribal
custom after January 31, 1954 may not be validated by the tribal court but is
recognized as a common law marriage."" The court, citing a 1972 federal
district court decision, then listed the requirements of a common law
marriage: (1) consent to be husband and wife; (2) actual cohabitation; and (3)
175. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6035, 6036 (Navajo 1988).
176. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6112 (Navajo 1990). For a discussion of the right to
marriage under Navajo common law, see infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
177. In re Marriage of Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6113, 6113-14 (Navajo 1989) (citing Navajo Tribal Council Res. CF-2-54 (Feb. 11, 1954)
(codified at NAvAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 9, § 61 (1977), amended by Navajo Tribal Council Res.
CAP-36-80 (Apr. 30, 1980))).
178. Id. at 6114.
179. In re Marriage of Daw, 1 Navajo Rptr. 1 (Navajo Ct. App. 1969).
180. Id. at 3-4. Note that by "common law marriage," the court apparently referred to Anglo-
style common law marriage, which is distinct from customary Navajo marriage.
181. 2 Navajo Rptr. 102 (Navajo. Ct. App. 1979).
182. Id. at 105.
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open acknowledgment to the community of the parties' married status.'83
Although the institution of Anglo-style common law marriage - as
opposed to Navajo customary marriage - was again confirmed by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court in 1988," a year later the court ruled in In re
Marriage of Francisco that "Navajo tradition and custom do not recognize
common-law marriage; therefore, this Court overrules all prior rulings that
Navajo courts can validate unlicensed marriages in which no Navajo
traditional ceremony occurred."'85 At the same time as it declared the
invalidity of Anglo-style common law marriages, the court noted the repeal
in 1980 of the Tribal Council's 1954 law and held that "[t]o enhance Navajo
sovereignty, preserve Navajo marriage tradition, and protect those who adhere
to it, Navajo courts will validate unlicensed Navajo traditional marriages
between Navajos. ""
The outcome of all the judicial sidestepping and reversals is that marriages
conducted according to Navajo tradition have always been upheld by the
Navajo courts, despite the temporary existence of a tribal statute apparently
instructing otherwise. The current case law, as expressed in Francisco,
recognizes only formally licensed marriages and marriages conducted
according to traditional Navajo ceremonies."'
2. Cohabitation
As discussed above, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has held that
relationships characterized by cohabitation will never rise to the level of
"marriage" unless a marriage license is obtained or a traditional Navajo
marriage ceremony is performed.' In fact, the court has noted that "Nava-
jos scorn those who have relationships out of marriage, and the man in such
a relationship is called a 'stay-until-dawn man.' The woman shares the scorn
because the term implies her need to sneak the man out before neighbors arise
and go out."'8 9 In 1983, however, Judge Tom Tso issued a decision from the
183. Id. (citing Kelly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
184. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6035, 6036 (Navajo 1988).
185. In re Marriage of Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6105, 6115 (Navajo 1989).
186. Id. at 6114-15.
187. The ceremonies have been described as consisting of at least the following components:
(1) the bride and bridegroom meet and agree to be married; (2) the parents of the bridegroom ask
the parents of the bride for her hand in marriage; (3) the bride and bridegroom share cornmeal
mush front the sacred basket; (4) the guests offer advice and good wishes to the bride and
bridegroom; and (5) an optional exchange of gifts occurs. Id. at 6113 (citing Navajo Tribal
Council Res. CJ-2-40 (June 3, 1940)). For a more extensive description of traditional Navajo
weddings, see 3 DAN VICENTI Er AL., THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE: DINE' BIBEE HAZ'AANII 275-77
(1972) [hereinafter 3 VIcENTI].
188. See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.




Window Rock District Court bench holding that a man traditionally assumed
obligations to a woman and her family and clan when he placed "his saddle
outside [her] hogan."'" Those obligations may include a duty to care for
adoptive children of the same clan as the woman."" The precise extent of
the man's obligations is unclear, but certainly must be tied to changes in male
and female roles in Navajo society."9
3. Husband-Wife Privilege
The Anglo common law principle that spouses may not be forced to testify
against one another in criminal cases was found by the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court, in a 1988 decision, to also exist at Navajo common law."
While the Navajo privilege apparently operates identically to the Anglo
version, it is explicitly grounded solely on the traditional Navajo interest in
"preserving the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship."''" The
court hedged its holding, however, by noting that it was putting off for
another occasion the weighing of the cultural interest behind the privilege




Interspousal immunity for unreasonable assault has been found by a Navajo
district court to be prohibited by Navajo common law. In Kuwanhyoima v.
Kuwanhyoima (Kuwanhyoima I), % a 1990 decision of the Tuba City District
Court, acting Judge Homer Bluehouse (concurrently serving on the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court) ruled that the common law principle of hozho
(harmony) dictated that a "man does not have the privilege of using
unreasonable force against his wife."'" Furthermore, separated spouses had
no privilege of assaulting or annoying one another in any manner.'8 On the
facts of Kuwanhyoima I, Bluehouse ruled that the defendant's assault and
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6112 (Navajo 1990); see also Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6113 (noting that "[u]nder traditional Navajo thought,
unmarried couples who live together act immorally because they are said to steal each other").
190. In re Adoption of S.C.M., 4 Navajo Rptr. 167, 172 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
191. Id.
192. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
193. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6035, 6036 (Navajo 1988).
194. IL
195. l
196. No. TC-CV-344-84 (Tuba City Dist. Ct. Apr. 9, 1990).
197. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
198. !d. slip op. at 3 (citing Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250,
252-53 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982)). Acting Judge Bluehouse also noted that "[following
separation there is no privilege which allows a man to interfere with the dignity of his wife." Id.
(citing Apache, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 252-53)).
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attempted rape of his estranged wife was not characterized by "reason or




Customary divorce has been illegal in the Navajo Nation since 1940, when
the Navajo Tribal Council passed legislation requiring all divorces to be
authorized by the courts.' Nonetheless, the courts have referred to tradi-
tional divorce procedures in such matters as determining the Navajo common
law of property division, discussed below."'
2. Property Division
The sole decision on Navajo common law divorce and property division
is Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., a 1982 opinion written
by Judge Tom Tso on the Window Rock District Court. In considering
whether a divorced woman could collect on her deceased former husband's
life insurance policy, the court discussed at length the Navajo divorce
customs, saying that with regard to property division, "Under Navajo custom
the woman can simply keep the property of the marriage and send the man
to his own family, taking only his own property acquired before the marriage.
She also has the option of working out an arrangement with the man."'
The common law rule, then, appears to have been that the woman had the
choice whether to take the property acquired during the marriage.' The
court stressed, however, that once the divorce was finalized, the woman
surrendered any right to further claims of property:
199. Id., slip op. at 4. Exactly what Judge Bluehouse would have considered "reasonable"
or "propo.tional" force is unclear, but the implication is that in such cases an assault would be
justified.
The solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has argued a stronger position: "Under
Navajo common law, violence toward women, or mistreatment of them in any way, is illegal."
James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho' Sokee' - Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence
Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407, 413 (1993).
200. NAvAJO TRB. CODE tit. 9, § 407 (1977); see In re Marriage of Slim, 3 Navajo Rptr.
218 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 1982) (holding that statute outlawing customary divorces overrides
Navajo custom and tradition); Apache, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 252-53 (discussing forms of customary
divorce but acknowledging that such divorces are illegal by tribal statute). For a discussion of
traditional Navajo divorce procedures, see 3 VIcENri, supra note 187, at 302-05.
201. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
202. 3 Navajo Rptr. 250 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
203. Id. at 253.
204. See 3 VicmriN, supra note 187, at 303-04 (noting that Navajo divorces traditionally
resulted in all property, including any private property owned by the male spouse before
marriage, being left with the female spouse).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/3
NOTES & COMMENTS
There was a principle of finality in Navajo customary divorce,
and the principle of restoring harmony in the community by
quickly and finally breaking ties so the community can soon
return to normal is one which is common-sense. To permit a
former spouse to keep such ties that she or he may be said to be
lurking behind the hogan waiting to take a portion of the corn
harvest is unthinkable ....
Applying this common law principle of finality, the court held that the
appellant was not entitled to collect on the proceeds of her former husband's
insurance policy, despite the express designation of the appellant as a
beneficiary in the policy.
3. Alimony
In the 1980 decision, Johnson v. Johnson,' the Navajo Court of Appeals
upheld an award of alimony to a fifty-two-year-old homemaker and mother
who was unable to support herself after her divorce.' The court considered
Navajo custom, and concluded that traditionally alimony did not exist -
instead, the responsibility for continuing support of the female spouse fell on
her family.a On the facts of the case, however, the court determined that
it was not feasible for the appellee's family to support her and that there was
nothing in Navajo common law to prohibit Navajo courts from awarding
alimony.1 0
Later, a 1986 decision of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Sells v.
Sells," ' confirmed the Johnson ruling, holding that in general Navajo courts
were permitted under Navajo common law to award alimony." The court
also set out a number of "guidelines" to aid district courts in determining
whether alimony was warranted. 2 3 These guidelines listed several factors to
be considered, including the needs and age of the spouse seeking support, the
length of the marriage, the economic situation of each spouse, and other
information."4
Alimony appears to be one area of current Navajo law where the
application of customs and traditions of the Navajo is not particularly
appropriate. Before the introduction of the wage economy and its consequent
205. 1d at 254.
206. Id. at 253-54.
207. 3 Navajo Rptr. 9 (Navajo Ct. App. 1980).
208. Id. at 10-11, 13.
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id.
211. 5 Navajo Rptr. 104 (Navajo 1986).
212. Id. at 105 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr 9 (Navajo Ct. App. 1980)).
213. Id. at 106.
214. Id. The court also included in its list "[c]onsideration of Navajo tradition and customary
Navajo law, where applicable." Id.
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destructive effects on the traditional roles of married couples, wives held the
economic power in families because they controlled the valuable family
property, including the livestock and land! When divorce occurred, the
woman was left with virtually all of the family property and could continue
to work the fields and raise the livestock - usually with the aid of her
extended family.216 As the influence of European-Americans grew, however,
women suddenly became dependent on their husbands, who would support the
family by working for wages either on or off the reservation."' A divorce
would then leave the Navajo woman in much the same position as a
traditional Anglo woman - without income, property, skills, work experience,
or other ability to support herself.1 Alimony, nonexistent in the past,
became a practical necessity.
4. Child Custody
The Navajo common law with respect to child custody was first addressed
in 1982 by the Navajo Court of Appeals in Lente v. Notah."9 While holding
that the district court was free to disregard tradition in consideration of other
factors, the court noted that Navajo children customarily went with their
mother in the event of a divorce.' "There are exceptions to this general
rule, of course, but they are said to be rare and ... must be approved by
everyone concerned, especially the head mothers."'"
Also in 1982, however, the Window Rock District Court issued a child
custody ruling that offered a different interpretation of the relevant common
law. In Goldtooth v. Goldtoothm Judge Tom Tso recognized that children
were members of the mother's clan, and that this fact "could be used as an
element of preference in a child custody case."m Tso went on, however, to
hold that the traditional importance of the extended family to Navajo children
should trump the "mother's clan" rule, and that child custody should therefore
be determined by considering "the children's place in the entire extended
family."' Judge Tso's interpretation has apparently won out over that of
215. 3 VICENTI, supra note 187, at 314, 333.
216. Id. at 304.
217. Id. at 316.
218. For an examination of the adverse impact of the wage economy on the self-reliance and
social status of Navajo women, see Laila S. Hamamsy, The Role of Women in a Changing
Navaho Society, 59 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 101 (1957). But see Mary Shepardson, The Status of
Navajo Women, 6 AM. INDIAN Q. 149 (1982) (concluding that Navajo women have regained their
high status since the advent of the wage economy).
219. 3 Navajo Rptr. 72, 80-81 (Navajo Ct. App. 1982).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 81 (citing GARY WITHERSPOON, NAvAio KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 76-77 (1975)).
222. 3 Navajo Rptr. 223 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).




Lente; a 1984 decision of the court of appeals, Pavenyouma v. Goldtooth,
quoted Tso's "brilliant analysis" and upheld an award of joint custody under
Navajo common law.'
5. Child Support
The principle that a father must support his children is firmly embedded
in Navajo common law:
It is plain under the customary law of the Navajo People that a
father of a child owes that child, or at least its mother, the duty
of support. It is said that if a man has a child by a woman and
fails to support it, "He has stolen the child." In other words, the
man who receives the benefit and joy of having a child is a thief
if he does not share in the worldly burdens of taking care of
it.
m
While the above quotation is taken from a 1983 decision, the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court has reaffirmed this common law obligation many times
since.' The duty was clarified by the court in the 1987 decision, Notah v.
Francis,' where it held that: (1) child support was an absolute obligation
owed to the child, though it might be paid to the mother; (2) the duty to make
child support payments would continue for as long as needed, or for as long
as the court ordered; and (3) the duty could not be relieved by the mother's
failure to take legal action - i.e., no statute of limitations applied."
The rigid tenor of Notah was relaxed somewhat by a 1988 supreme court
decision, Descheenie v. Mariano,"' wherein the court held: (1) the duty to
provide child support applied to both parents; (2) each parent had to
contribute "his or her reasonable share toward the child's support, according
to each parent's income and resources"; and (3) the level of support had to be
one that the child was accustomed to. 2 The court emphasized that the child
support award must not reduce the paying parent to absolute poverty, "keeping
in mind that for the child to prosper, the parents must also prosper."3 The
court then provided a general formula, taking into account the adjusted net
225. 5 Navajo Rptr. 17 (Navajo Ct. App. 1984).
226. Id. at 19, 20.
227. Tom v. Tom, 4 Navajo Rptr. 12, 13 (Navajo Ct. App. 1983).
228. Most recently, in Nez v. Nez, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6123, 6125 (Navajo 1992). In Nez, the court held that it "cannot be restrained by the failure of
one parent to ask for child support, or back child support, from the other" in a divorce settlement
the court must ensure that children's best interests are met. Id.
229. 5 Navajo Rptr. 147 (Navajo 1987).
230. a d at 148-49.
231. 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6039 (Navajo 1988).
232. Id. at 6039.
233. Id.
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incomes of both parents and the reasonable needs of the children, for district
courts to use in calculating child support awards."
V. Property and Land Use Law
As for all Indian tribes, land ownership and use is a distinctive and
complicated area of law for the Navajo Nation. Title of reservation land is
owned by the United States government for the benefit of the entire tribe,
while use rights are held by individuals."5 Navajos also have claims to
allotment lands, and some own land in fee.' Further muddling things is the
fact that families and clans are often the actual users of the land, although an
individual owns the land use permit. 7 Much of this area of the law is
governed by statutes and regulations - both federal and tribal." ' The
Navajo courts have, however, found common law principles applicable to land
disputes.
A. Common Property
While the concept of private property is hardly alien to Navajos, private
ownership of land "is unknown in the Navajo Nation." 9 The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court, quoting a 1983 district court decision of Judge Tom Tso,
recently explained this common law concept as follows: "Land is basic to the
survival of the Navajo People. While it is said that land belongs to the clans,
more accurately it may be said that the land belongs to those who live on it
and. ., use it and who depend upon it for survival - the Navajo People.""40
Tso went on in his decision to note the common law responsibility of the
Navajo courts to protect the land of the Navajo Nation, ensure its management
in the best interests of the Navajo People, and bring it to "undisputed and
peaceful use."' Thus, Tso held, the sale of a business situated on the
Navajo reservation was subject to scrutiny for determination of whether the
sale reflected the best interests of the Navajo Nation.U
On the other hand, improvements upon land are considered private
234. d . at 6040.
235. CANBY, supra note 3, at 268. Note that the Navajo Nation also owns land in fee. 3
VICENTI, supra note 187, at 343, 345.
236. 3 VICENT, supra note 187, at 343-45.
237. See Begay v. Keedah, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6021,
6022 (Navajo 1991).
238. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 167 (1992) (federal grazing regulations); NAVAjO TRIB. COD- tit.
3 (1977).
239. Hood v. Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6061, 6063
(Navajo 1991).
240. Md (quoting Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 159, 161 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.
1983)).





property. u3 Grazing and other land use permits are also legally the property
of particular individuals, though the customary trust doctrine, when it applies,
gives a shared interest in a permit to the family that uses it (see below).Y
B. Customary Land Use
In 1974, the Navajo Court of Appeals first made use of the term "tradition-
al use area" in Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co., a case involving
the exercise by the Navajo Nation of eminent domain over an area on which
the plaintiffs had their home and grazed their livestock.2 The court held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation for the taking of "their"
land."l Twelve years later, in a probate case, In re Estate of Wauneka,241
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court recognized that "[e]very acre of land on the
reservation not reserved for a special purpose is a part of someone's
customary use area," thus establishing the fundamental importance of this
particular aspect of Navajo common law.249 The court in Wauneka offered
this explanation of customary usage:
Land use on the Navajo Reservation is unique and unlike private
ownership of land off the reservation. While individual tribal
members do not own land similar to off reservation, there exists
a possessory use interest in land which we recognize as customary
usage. An individual normally confines his use and occupancy of
land to an area traditionally inhabited by his ancestors. This is the
customary use area concept.-
After holding that, under Dennison, customary usage rights were a legal
property interest, the court set forth the factors that established that a
customary use area was at issue before the court: (1) the decedent had
"exercised continuous and exclusive possessory use of the land during his
lifetime"; (2) this usage was "never disputed by either the sovereign, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, or other land users from the immediate area"; and
(3) the area was "fenced and readily ascertainable."'"
The court in Wauneka did not assert that the factors it listed should govern
all claims of customary usage, although there appears to be no conflict
243. In re Estate of Wauneka, 5 Navajo Rptr. 79, 81 (Navajo 1986).
244. Begay, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6022; Johnson v.
Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr 9, 12 (Navajo Ct. App. 1980).
245. 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (Navajo Ct. App. 1974).
246. Id. at 96-98.
247. Id. at 105.
248. 5 Navajo Rptr. 79, 81 (Navajo 1986)
249. Id. at 83.
250. Id. at 81. For a description of traditional Navajo legal perspectives on "custom use"
areas, see 3 VICENTI, supra note 187, at 280.
251. Wauneka, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 82.
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between those criteria and a statement by the court in 1991 in Hood v.
BordyI that "individual Navajos who use or improve the land with build-
ings, corrals, fences, etc. create for themselves a customary use ownership
interest."" 3 The Hood Court reaffirmed that such property interests were
valid and noted that owners of customary usage rights could sell or dispose
of their improvements to that land as they wished.'
In Yazzie v. Catron,5  a 1992 decision, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
discussed the relationship between customary usage areas and grazing permits.
The court held that permit holders also were required to have general usage
rights to the land described in the permit, and that "[s]uch rights are most
frequently held as a customary use area on land occupied by the permit
holder's family in previous generations."'
C. Customary Trusts: Family Property Rights
Customary trusts were developed by the Navajo courts for the main
purposes of simplifying the probate of permits and land, and of giving a legal
structure to traditional Navajo family-based usage of land. 7 While a
customary trust may be set up by the courts with the consent of the concerned
parties at the time of distribution of a decedent's estate, a customary trust may
also come into existence when a holder of a permit or land use right passes
it on to one of her children to be held and used for the benefit of that child
and the other children or grandhildren. 8 No written opinions of the Navajo
courts have yet addressed a dispute over proper management of a customary
trust, though the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has emphasized that Navajo
common law trusts "have nothing to do with the American common law
trust.,"
2 9
252. 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6061 (Navajo 1991).
253. Id. at 6063.
254. Id. (citing BERARD HAILE, PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF THE NAvAHO INDIANS 11 (1954)).
255. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6125 (Navajo 1992).
256. Id. at 6126.
257. Wauneka, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 82. Customary family and clan ownership of certain kinds
of proper.y has been documented in the anthropological literature. According to Berard Haile's
landmark study, based on data gathered in 1910, Navajo "[f]amilial and individual properties.
. often blend with no particular regard for assigning ownership definitely." BERARD HAILE,
PROPERTYf CONCEPTS OF THE NAVAHO INDIANS 13 (photo. reprint 1978) (1954). Such "blending"
occurred particularly with regard to family expenses - such as cooking ware, bedding, and
ceremony expenses. Id. Gifts were given by the bridegroom to the bride's family. Id. Clan
ownership was virtually unknown in Navajo tradition, except insofar as restitution was concerned.
Id. at 5-9. When a member of a clan was killed or raped, compensation to the victim's clan was
demanded of the offender. Id. at 7-9.
258. Begay v. Keedah, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6021, 6022
(Navajo 1991); Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr 9, 12 (Navajo Ct. App. 1980).




D. Grazing and Land Use Permits
"In Navajo common law a grazing permit is one of the most important
items of property which a Navajo may own."'  The reasons for the signifi-
cance attached to grazing permits is obvious: under the Navajo Nation Tribal
Code, the grazing of livestock is not allowed on land owned by the Navajo
Nation unless a valid permit has been issued. To a large extent, however,
Navajo common law governs the use of grazing and land use permits. Most
importantly, while a permit is issued to a specifically named individual,
Navajo family units are traditionally the actual beneficiaries of the permitsa
and the courts have established customary trusts (discussed above) to resolve
this conflict between statutory and common law. The symbiotic relation-
ship between permits and customary land use areas has also been established
by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court; in the 1992 decision Yazzie v. Catron
the court noted that, while grazing of livestock was not allowed without a
permit, permit holders had to have concurrent land use rights before the
permit could be exercised.'
E. Adverse Possession and Abandonment
In a 1982 decision, Shirley v. James,' the Navajo Court of Appeals
indicated that "customary adverse possession" existed at Navajo common
law. The court upheld the district court's determination that "[tihe long
period of occupation and land use by the plaintiffs father" constituted
customary adverse possession.' As the facts of the case were not given,
however, the doctrine has remained essentially undefined. Insofar as
ownership of land is concerned, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has ruled
that land of the Navajo Nation may not be "wrested away through adverse
possession or prescription by individual occupiers."' Any customary
adverse possession, therefore, would necessarily apply only to land usage rights.
260. In re Estate of Jce, 4 Navajo Rptr. 99, 99 (Navajo Ct. App. 1983).
261. NAvAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 781 (1977).
262. See, e.g., Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 12 (holding, under Navajo common law, that when
a land use permit is given as a gift, the permit does not become the donee's separate property,
but is presumed to belong to the donee's entire family); see also Earl v. Earl, 3 Navajo Rptr. 16
(Navajo Ct. App. 1980) (dismissing action on authority of Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr.
9 (Navajo Ct. App. 1980)).
263. Begay, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6022; Johnson, 3
Navajo Rptr. at 12.
264. Yazzie v. Catron, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6125, 6126-
27 (Navajo 1992). See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
265. 3 Navajo Rptr. 83 (Navajo Ct. App. 1982).
266. Id. at 83.
267. Id.
268. Hood v. Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6061, 6063
(Navajo 1991).
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"Another aspect of traditional Navajo land tenure is the principle that one
must use it or lose it."'  In Begay v. Keedah, a 1991 decision, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court determined that, on remand, title to a grazing permit
should be quieted with the foregoing principle in mind.' On the facts of the
case, the court noted the appellant's allegation that the particular permit in
question had not been used for thirty-five years!" No published decision of
the Navajo courts, however, has either applied or offered further explanation
of the common law with regard to abandonment of property interests.
VI. Probate Law
Custom and tradition are nowhere more apparent than in probate law, and
nowhere else are custom and tradition more likely to diverge from Anglo-
American law, for the simple reason that the disposal of estates is inevitably
linked to cultural kinship patterns.m The Navajo courts have used custom
in probate matters at least since opinions began to be published.7" Custom
has been applied to resolve a great variety of probate-related problems. The
distribution of intestate property is clearly governed by Navajo common
law; 4 both the Navajo Nation Tribal Code and the Navajo Rules of Probate
Procedure specify that custom takes precedence over all other sources of
authority in that area of law, so long as custom is asserted and proved by the
parties. 5 Similarly, the courts have employed common law in the interpre-
tation of wills, and especially oral willsY6 Finally, the development of the
legal idea of a "customary trust" is fundamentally a probate matter and based
on Navajo tradition.'m Each of these areas of the Navajo probate common
law jurisprudence is discussed below.
A. Classification and Intestate Distribution of Property
The authoritative opinion discussing traditional Navajo concepts of intestate
property distribution is In re Estate of Apachee," a 1983 district court
decision written by Judge Tom Tso and given the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court's stamp of approval in 1988. Tso began by finding that property
269. Begay, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6023.
270. Id. The court ordered the lower court to employ "the equitable principles of Navajo
common law." Id.
271. Id.
272. For an anthropological analysis of Navajo kinship and inheritance structures, see
KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 91, at 105-09.
273. See In re Trust of Benally, 1 Navajo Rptr. 10, 12 (Navajo Ct. App. 1969).
274. In re Estate of Wauneka, 5 Navajo Rptr. 79, 82-83 (Navajo 1986).
275. NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 10 (issued by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court); NAVAJO
TRIB. CODE tit. 8, § 2(b) (1977).
276. See infra notes 306-17 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.
278. 4 Navajo Rptr. 178 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).




was traditionally divided into "productive" and "nonproductive" goods."0
Productive goods included those items of property that essentially benefitted
more than solely the deceased."' Such goods could include livestock, land,
and land use or grazing permits.m The test was whether a particular piece
of property was "an essential piece of property for the maintenance of the
[decedent's] camp;" the camp being the group of family and clan members
living together with the decedent. If the test was met, then that property
was considered "productive," and upon the death of the property holder it was
"held for the benefit of those living in the camp."' The intestate distribu-
tion of productive property, therefore, was governed by who lived in the same
camp as did the deceased property holder.
Nonproductive goods, on the other hand, included "jewelry, tools and
equipment, and non-subsistence livestock such as horses. ' '2Bs Judge Tso
noted that cash "can present a special problem because it can be treated either
as productive property or nonproductive property.""28 Nonproductive
property traditionally was subject to special distribution proceedings.'
These proceedings, under Apachee's interpretation of the common law, had to
be held at the decedent's camp and be supervised by a naat'aanii (community
leader or peacemaker). The decedent's nonproductive property would then
be distributed with preference for immediate family members and consider-
ation of the relative needs and places of residence of all claimants s9 The
"immediate family" was defined by the claimant's biological closeness with,
actual residential proximity to, and extent of mutual assistance and support
exchanged with the decedent.' Children not residing with the decedent
6053 (Navajo 1988) (approving In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178 (Window Rock Dist.
Ct. 1983)).






286. Id. "Treated as productive property, cash would be held in the camp for its economic
security as a unit. Seen as nonproductive, cash would be distributed among family members."
Id. The court seemed to imply that the appropriate classification of cash would depend on the
specific facts of the case. Note, however, that the presumption will apparently be that the cash
is nonproductive. See id. at 183 (treating money as nonproductive because neither party claimed
otherwise).
287. See id. at 182.
288. Id. For a discussion of the significance of the naat'aanii in Navajo common law, see
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
289. Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. at 182.
290. Id. at 183. While the court cited to case law grappling with the definition of "immediate
family" in the context of oral wills, it did not specifically argue that the definition should be the
same in the intestate situation. See id. (citing In re Estate of Lee, 1 Navajo Rptr. 27 (Navajo Ct.
App. 1971); In re Estate of Benally, 1 Navajo Rptr. 219 (Navajo Ct. App. 1978)). As the
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were considered members of the immediate family, although they might have
to also demonstrate need.
Finally, items of personal property may be buried with the decedent under
Navajo tradition.' Similarly, the decedent's clothing may be burned."
B. Customary Trusts and Grazing/Land Use Permits
The probating of land use and grazing permits, including customary land
use claims, has posed a special problem in the Navajo Nation as the available
land base has diminished in proportion to the growing population.' Insofar
as land use permits are concerned, courts must, under the Tribal Code,
transfer the permit to the decedent's "most logical heir."'2 s Furthermore,
courts must "make every effort to keep the land assignment in one tract and
not subdivide it."' The Navajo Nation Supreme Court articulated a more
generally applicable rule regarding probate of permits in 1987 in In re Estate
of Benally v. Denetclaw:2 ' "[A] court probating land use and grazing
permits held and used by a family unit must consider the pattern of land use
and the relationships within the family in dividing the estate.... Interests in
productive land cannot simply be divided up according to the intestate statutes
,,298
The obvious ambiguities and unpredictable results of the "most logical
heir" clause in the Tribal Code prompted the Navajo courts to begin handling
probate disputes over permits and customary land usage by creating
"customary trusts," the aim of which was explicitly to "keep tracts of land and
grazing permits intact and in the family."' Where a customary trust has
been established, the entrusted property descends "in somewhat the same way
significance of the immediate family to establish the validity of an oral will is somewhat different
than in the intestate context, it may be that a more inclusive definition should pertain in the latter
case.
291. See id. (holding that child living with decedents ex-spouse was member of decedent's
immedirtte family "because he was 'bom for' his father's clan and is in need of assistance").
The district court in Apachee ordered another hearing for a determination of what the relative
needs of the decedents heirs were. Id. at 184.
292. Il at 183.
293. Id.
294. The 1990 census put the total resident population of the Navajo Nation at 148,451. The
tribal land area was just over 25,000 square miles. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF
LABOR, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICs: AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE AREAS 11 (1992) (vol. CP-1-IA).
295. In re Estate of Benally v. Denetclaw, 5 Navajo Rptr. 174, 179 (Navajo 1987) (citing
NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 3, § 785 (1977)).
296. Id.
297. 5 Navajo Rptr. 174 (Navajo 1987).
298. Id. at 180.





as property held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship."' Thus, the
decedent's interest in the property simply passes in equal proportions to the
remaining members of the trust.' Parties to the trust are determined by the
court, and patterns of land use and family relationships must be factors in that
determination."° A court must only allow the creation of a trust if the heirs
are able to cooperate with one another and effectively manage the trust.'
Thus, a customary trust may not be imposed upon unwilling parties, and
dissenting claimants may be excluded from a trust established among the
other claimants."° If the decedent is the holder of the permit, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court has noted that under Navajo tradition the "'most logical
heir,' who is personally involved in using the permit," will become the new
holder. 5
C. Wills
In 1988, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court wrote: "We can find no record
of testamentary succession, either written or oral, in Navajo custom before the
introduction during the middle of this century of the Anglo-American legal
concept of succession through designation in a will."3" Despite its disclaim-
er, however, the court has judicially noticed that oral wills are a "well-estab-
lished" Navajo custom, and it has upheld the validity of such wills, subject to
certain conditions.r
The seminal opinion on oral wills is In re Estate of Lee,30 a 1971
decision of the court of appeals in which the appellant raised the existence of
an oral will to challenge a probate judgment issued by the district court."c
The court first noted that oral wills were a traditional Navajo method of
devising property." ' There were two requirements, however, that had to be
met before such a will would be considered legally valid: (1) the oral will had
300. Denetclaw, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 180.
301. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court noted that the primary difference between Navajo
customary trusts and joint tenancies was that "[clommon-law requirements governing the creation
and destruction of joint tenancies do not apply to customary trusts." Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. (citing In re Estate of Wauneka, 5 Navajo Rptr. 79, 82 (Navajo 1986)). 'Effective
management" of the customary trust apparently requires an intention on the part of the members
of the trust to keep the land intact and to use the land productively (e.g., for farming or grazing).
See id.
304. Id.
305. Begay v. Keedah, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6021, 6022
(Navajo 1991) (citing Denetclaw, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 179).
306. In re Estate of Thomas, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6053,
6054 (Navajo 1988).
307. See id. (citing Lee, I Navajo Rptr. at 31).
308. 1 Navajo Rptr. 27 (Navajo Ct. App. 1971).
309. Id. at 28-29.
310. Id. at 31.
No. 2] 419
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
to be made in the presence of the testator's immediate family; and (2) the
members of the immediate family had to agree to the terms of the will?"
In 1988 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court phrased the second requirement to
be that the immediate family "agree that the testator orally made known his
or her last will before them," thus apparently doing away with any need for
family members to agree to the provisions of the will at the time of its
making?
12
The court wrestled for seventeen years with the question of who comprised
a testator's immediate family for purposes of an oral will. In Lee 3 itself, the
court found that because the testator's wife and children were not present at
the making of the alleged will, it was invalid? 4 In 1978, the court adopted
the rule that the children of the testator's first marriage, who were not living
with the devisor when he died, did not have to be present for an oral will to
be valid.' This rule was discarded, however, in In re Estate of Thomas,"2 6
a 1988 decision by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. The court in Thomas
asserted that the prior decision excluding children born of former marriages
from the immediate family was "inconsistent with the Navajo custom which
teaches that parents should view each of their children equally," and it
adopted a "strict rule that all children of the deceased constitute the immediate
family" and must therefore be present at the making of a valid oral will."7
VII. Common Law Rights
Prior to 1987, the Navajo Nation courts had not applied common law to
questions of the rights and liberties of parties. The reasons for this reluctance
- or lack of opportunity - are unclear. Most likely, however, the existence
of both the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the Navajo Nation Bill of
Rights were viewed as sufficient supporting legal authority in cases involving
rights?"' The recent surge in the use of common law in this area is probably
311. Id. at 32.
312. Thomas, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6054. James Zion,
the solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, has suggested that the notion of civil rights
itself is antithetical to traditional Navajo law, which is premised on the existence of a non-
authoritarian government. Letter, supra note 23.
313. 1 Navajo Rptr. 27 (Navajo Ct. App. 1971).
314. Id. at 32.
315. Estate of Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209, 222-23 (Window Rock Dist.
Ct. 1986).
316. 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6053 (Navajo 1988).
317. Id. at 6054.
318. See, e.g., Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Elec. Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. 95, 98-99 (Navajo Ct.
App. 1974) (finding right to due process deriving from the U.S. Constitution, the ICRA, and the
Navajo Bill of Rights).
Native American tribes are not subject to the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution. See,
e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896). Consequently, in 1968 Congress passed the




a manifestation of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's increasing inclination
to use and develop Navajo common law wherever applicable, regardless of
other sources of authority."9 During the last five years, the court has found
that a great variety of individual rights are preserved in the Navajo common
law, including the rights to: association with relatives, access to the courts,
due process, equal protection of the law, marriage, political liberty, nondis-
crimination on the basis of sex, and legal representation. In addition, the court
has developed children's rights and the idea of "fundamental" rights. Finally,
a recent opinion by the court's solicitor notes a traditional Navajo right to
privacy."
A. Access to the Courts
The common law right to one's day in court was recognized by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court in the 1990 decision, Plummer v. Plummer.32" ' The
court noted that Navajos traditionally exercised this right in community and
family gatherings, where disputes were resolved by consensus." The precise
extent of the right is unclear, but it at least guarantees "an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way."3 A party asserting
lack of an opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful time" must demonstrate
that she was unable to prepare and raise her claims in time and that harm or
prejudice to her case will result unless a continuance is granted.324 "Mean-
closely tracking those in the federal Constitution. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988). The reaction to
ICRA was not positive among American Indians: "Few Native Americans saw the ICRA as a
protection of their individual rights against tribal violations. Instead, most Indians saw it as a
federal intrusion into their affairs." Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect
Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 171
(1991).
It was in anticipation of these concerns that the Navajo Tribal Council in 1967 enacted the
Navajo Bill of Rights. NAVAJO TRiB. CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-9 (1967) (amended 1986); see Bennett
v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6009, 6010 (Navajo 1990). Chief Justice Robert Yazzie explained the courts' preference for
relying on the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, at least insofar as the right to due process is
concerned, in a 1992 speech to Amnesty International's Legal Support Network:
Today, the Courts of the Navajo Nation apply the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights.
. in light of Navajo common law. One of the reasons we do this is that there are
cultural differences between the general American notions of civil rights and
Navajo ideas of what "due process" or "equal protection of the law" happen to be.
Due process means fundamental fairness, and that is a value judgment.
Robert Yazzie, The Indian Civil Rights Act: Address Before the University of Cincinnati College
of Law 5 (Jan. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
319. For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
320. These points are each discussed at infra notes 321-75 and accompanying text.
321. 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6151 (Navajo 1990).
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ingful way" is apparently satisfied when a court allows a party an opportunity
to raise her claims in some fashion.3"
B. Association with Relatives
In the 1990 decision, Arizona Public Service Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor
Relations,32 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held invalid a public utility
company's anti-nepotism policy prohibiting the hiring of persons related by
marriage and requiring that all relatives be at least two supervisory levels
apart within the company's employee structure.3" In striking down the
policy, the court asserted that the policy violated, among other rights, the
fundamental right under Navajo common law to associate freely with one's
relatives.3"
C. Children's Rights
As discussed above, the Navajo courts have relied extensively on Navajo
common law in their decisions regarding children. 29 The subject of
children's rights has been no exception. In In re A.W.,3  a 1988 decision, the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court considered whether children were entitled to
due process in juvenile criminal proceedings.3 ' The court determined that
the rights of children "are customarily protected to the same extent as are the
rights of adults," and that therefore due process was required in juvenile
proceedings just as in adult proceedings.332 With respect to the facts at hand,
the court held that a child's right to due process required, in a delinquency
proceeding, that notice be given to the child's parent or guardian, that
representation by an attorney be provided the child, and that the parent or




The right to due process has been explored more often by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court than any other right. In a 1992 decision, In re Estate
of Begay #2,3  the court offered a summary of the case law bearing on the
325. Id ("What is a 'meaningful way?' If a party is allowed an opportunity to raise any
claim he or she may have and the court allows an opportunity and procedure for doing so, that
is sufficient.").
326. 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6105 (Navajo 1990).
327. Id. at 6113-14.
328. Id. at 6113.
329. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
330. R5 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6041 (Navajo 1988).
331. Id. at 6043.
332. Id.
333. Id
334. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6130 (Navajo 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/3
NOTES & COMMENTS
common law right to due process:
Just as embedded as res judicata in the Navajo common law is the
principle of due process. Although due process of law is express-
ly guaranteed by section 3 of the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights,
this Court has noted that "[t]he concept of due process was not
brought to the Navajo Nation by the Indian Civil Rights Act...
[nor] the Navajo Bill of Rights." Instead, due process is "funda-
mental fairness in a Navajo cultural context," and "strict standards
of fairness and equity . . . are inherent in the Navajo common
law." Due process is found by synthesizing the principles of
Navajo custom and government, and it is applied "with fairness
and respect."
This Court has held that Navajo due process ensures notice and
an opportunity to be heard for all parties to a dispute; entitles
parties to representation; protects the right to seek political office;
prevents the enforcement of ambiguous statutes affecting personal
and property rights; must be provided when the government takes
private property without the owner's consent; and applies to
juvenile proceedings to the same extent as to adult proceed-
ings335
Clearly, then, the court has made due process the guarantor of many other
subsidiary rights. Equally obvious is the fact that the court views due process
as essentially a component of Navajo common law which is only buttressed
by specific guarantees in tribal and federal statutes.336
In Begay #2 itself, the court ruled that the appellant's due process rights
were not violated by a trial judge's sua sponte raising of res judicata against
the appellant; although a minimal appearance of impropriety may have been
demonstrated, it was outweighed by interests in judicial economy.37 The
court did indicate, however, that a more "significant appearance of bias on the
part of a judge might constitute a violation of a party's due process rights."
3
The court also ruled that due process was satisfied when the appellant was not
denied an opportunity to participate in a suit involving her interests; even if
the court failed to take action on her motion to intervene, the appellant's
remedy was to file for a writ of mandamus.339
335. Id. at 6131 (citations omitted).
336. Id.
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E. Equal Protection of the Law
The right to equal protection under the law has arisen in the recorded
opinions of the Navajo courts only with regard to the equal status of women
and men." In Davis v. Davis,34' a 1987 divorce case, the supreme court
noted that while equal protection was guaranteed by the Navajo Nation Bill
of Rights and ICRA, "the Navajo people have traditionally recognized that
Navajo women have equal status with Navajo men to participate in decisions
affecting family and tribe."" The court relied on this aspect of Navajo
common law to hold that the appellant wife could argue paternity of her child
before the district court."3
A stronger statement was made by the court in Navajo Nation v. Mur-
phy, ' a 1988 decision that considered the merits of retaining a husband-
wife privilege against forced testimony in the Navajo courts. While holding
that the privilege would be kept, the court took pains to note that it would not
be based on the rationale underlying the traditional Anglo common law
privilege: namely, that wives did not have a separate legal existence from
their husbands" 5 "Navajo tradition and culture have always revered the role
of Navajo women within Navajo society," the court said.'
In 1990, the court considered a claim brought under title 1, section 3 of the
340. The equal rights of women in American Indian tribes has been a subject of concern.
Even after the passage of the ICRA in 1968, which imposed many of the provisions of the United
States Bill of Rights on tribes, Native American women have often not been accorded the same
rights as men by tribal courts. See generally Christofferson, supra note 318.
It should be noted, however, that
Native American people, and in particular Native American women, have
suffered a longer history of discrimination in the United States than any minority
group. Much of this discrimination arose out of the [federal] government's policies
of assimilation, termination, and genocide.
... Historically, in many North American Indian tribes, women enjoyed equal
rights with men and in some cases were .even considered superior to men.
Id. at 177. Whether or not this analysis is entirely accurate with regard to the Navajo tribe, the
resurrection of common law attitudes towards equality of the sexes may prove to be an important
progressive effect of the current movement of the Navajo courts.
341. 5 Navajo Rptr. 169 (Navajo 1987).
342. l. at 171. The solicitor to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, in an article discussing
domestic violence within the tribe, wrote:
Navajo norms and values, which are the foundations of the Navajo common law,
make it clear that women are equal with men, have a religiously-sanctioned status
through identity with Changing Woman, and have rights which arise from
individual dignity. The essential Navajo value is that while men and women are
distinct, they have relations with each other as complementary equals.
Zion, supra note 199, at 413.
343. Id.
344. 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6035 (Navajo 1988).





Navajo Tribal Code, barring the denial or abridgment of rights on account of
sex. 7 While its analysis rested on the Code provision, the court acknowl-
edged that the provision was added to the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights in
1980 for the express purpose of recognizing the traditional importance of
women in Navajo society."4
F. Fair Employment Opportunities
The Navajo common law right to work was addressed by the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court in 1990's Arizona Public Service Co. v. Office of
Navajo Labor Relations. 9 The court invoked the "fundamental... right to
a fair opportunity for employment" in upholding a labor relations board
decision striking down an overly strict anti-nepotism policy instituted by the
Arizona Public Service Company." The court did not elaborate on the
parameters of the right to employment opportunities, and the right has not
been addressed since that decision.
G. "Fundamental" Rights
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court in 1990 first began to hint that there
were certain rights that were more "fundamental," and hence presumably less
derogable, than others. In Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervi-
sors,"' the court set forth the idea that there existed a kind of "unwritten
constitutional law" or "natural law" comprised of customs and traditions that
were "fundamental and basic to Navajo life."3 2 This special body of
common law was the beehaz'aanii3 Rights springing from the beehaz'aanii
were themselves "fundamental," meaning they could only be limited "for good
and weighty reasons for the protection of the public interest."3 " The court
noted that the "rights retained by the people," acknowledged in the Navajo
Nation Bill of Rights, constituted such fundamental rights.35 Because the
standard of judicial review for government intrusions on "lesser" rights has
not yet been clearly established, however, the significance of fundamental
rights is ambiguous.
In Bennett, the court held that the right to political liberty, including the
347. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 6009, 6012 (Navajo 1990).
348. Id. (citing NAVAO NATION BILL OF RIGHTS pmbl., §§ 1, 5 (1986)).
349. 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6105 (Navajo 1990).
350. Id. at 6113.
351. 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6009 (Navajo 1990).
352. Id. at 6011.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 6012. The court's stated level of protection for fundamental rights may be less
than that accorded under the United States Constitution. See infra note 362 and accompanying
text.
355. Bennett, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6011.
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right to seek and hold governmental office, was a fundamental right.356 In
Arizona Public Service Co., also decided in 1990, the court added the rights
to marriage, free association with relatives, and fair opportunity for employ-
rent to the list of fundamental rights.3"
H. Marriage
The fundamental right to marriage, under Navajo common law, was
established by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court in 19902 8 The court cited
a prior decision, In re Marriage of Francisco,35 discussing the importance
of marriage in traditional Navajo society, and took dote of the scorn Navajos
traditionally held for out-of-marriage relationships.'
L Political Liberty
In 1990, the court in Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors held
that the right to political liberty also was fundamental under Navajo common
law: "there is a strong and fundamental tradition that any Navajo can
participate in the processes of government, and no person who is not
otherwise disqualified by a reasonable law can be prohibited from holding
public office."'" The "reasonable" level of scrutiny applied by the court at
first glance appears too lenient to be applicable to potential violations of a
"fundamental" right. 2 Elsewhere in Bennett, however, the court determined
that a "good and weighty reason" related to the public interest must be
demonstrated if the government is to be allowed to intrude on the right to
political liberty.' On the facts of Bennett, the court struck down a tribal
statute limiting the offices of president and vice president to former elected
officials and employees of the Navajo Nation.' The court held that the
statute was unreasonable and unsupported by a "valid and substantial
governmental interest."' 5
356. Id.
357. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6105, 6113 (Navajo 1990).
358. Id.
359. 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6113 (Navajo 1989).
360. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6112
(citing Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6113).
361. Bennett, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6011.
362. In U.S. constitutional law, for example, infringements on fundamental rights are subject
to strict judi.ia scrutiny for determination of whether the restriction is "narrowly tailored" to
serving a "compelling" governmental interest. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(holding that the right to marry is fundamental, so restrictive statute must be subjected to strict
scrutiny); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to decide whether to
have an abortion is fundamental and can only be outweighed by narrowly drawn statute supported
by compelling governmental interests).
363. Bennett, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6012.





While the Navajo courts have never addressed it, the right to privacy under
Navajo common law was asserted in an opinion of the solicitor to the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court to support the opinion's conclusion that random alcohol
testing as a condition of parole or probation was illegal.' The opinion cited
Associate Justice Homer Bluehouse as "a recognized expert on Navajo
traditional law" for the proposition that all persons, including criminals, were
traditionally accorded at least a minimal right to privacy under Navajo
common law. 67 The right to privacy of parolees and probationers, the
opinion found, could not be unreasonably infringed upon.'
K. Representation
The Navajo common law right to effective representation is firmly
established in Navajo Nation Supreme Court precedent. In Boos v. Yazzie, 3"
a 1990 challenge to the court's mandatory pro bono program for members of
the Navajo Nation Bar Association, the court defended the program by noting
the traditional Navajo practice of always allowing accused persons the option
of having a representative.37 Thus, the court held, indigent persons were
guaranteed under Navajo common law the right to representation?'
One year later, the court explored the issue more thoroughly in Navajo
Nation v. MacDonald, Sr.3" First, the court reiterated the holding of Boos
that the right to representation was guaranteed under Navajo common law.3"
The court then went on to note that the common law was actually stricter than
the standard set by the ICRA, in that the traditional Navajo representative had
to be a "good speaker" to avoid being considered ineffective and, therefore,
inadequate to satisfy the party's right.374 The court also hinted that the
representative must execute an acceptable level of planning in order to meet
the effectiveness standard.37
366. Random Alcohol-Use Testing of Parolees and Probationers, Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal
Courts, No. 92-05 (Sept. 30, 1992).
367. Md., slip op. at 6-7.
368. Id., slip op. at 14.
369. 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6115 (Navajo 1990).
370. Id. at 6116.
371. Id.
372. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6053, 6053 (Navajo 1991).
373. Id.
374. Id. The court noted that, traditionally,
[t]he effectiveness of a speaker (and there could be more than one) was measured
by what the speaker said. If the speaker spoke wisely and with knowledge while
persuading others in their search for consensus, that indicated effectiveness. If the
speaker hesitated, was unsure, or failed to move the others, that person was not a
good speaker and thus was ineffective.
Id.
375. Id. at 6056 ("Planning is an important Navajo value, and the record shows the defense
No. 2]
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VIII. Tort Law
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has not yet issued an opinion applying
Navajo common law to a case involving the commission of a tort. However,
in Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoiia (Kuwanhyoima II)," the court did uphold
a 1990 common law assault decision by the Tuba City District Court."' It
seems likely that the lack of supreme court common law precedent in the area
of torts is due simply to a lack of opportunity, rather than to an aversion to
applying common law in such cases. 7
Navajo common law may have broad future implications in the field of
torts. In a 1986 district court decision, Judge (now Chief Justice) Robert
Yazzie quoted a 1970 speech given before the National American Indian
Court Judges Association: .'.[W]hat is expected in all cases of injuries that
arise between traditional Navajos is that the person who did the injury will
make a symbolic material payment for the loss that he has caused .... '"'
It remains to be seen whether the Navajo courts will interpret this statement
to mean that strict liability existed under Navajo common law for all injuries
caused to others."'
A. Assault
In an important domestic violence case, Associate Justice Homer
Bluehouse in 1990 issued a decision as acting judge of the Tuba City District
Court addressing the Navajo common law of assault and rape. Kuwanhyoima
v. Kuwanhyoima (Kuwanhyoima )31 was brought as a civil action to recover
compensatory and punitive damages for the sexual assault of the plaintiff by
her husband, the defendant, who was aided in breaking into the plaintiffs
home by his sister.3"
Beginning with an affirmation of the traditional Navajo value of hozho, or
harmony, Bluehouse noted that "[i]nherent in that concept is proportionality,
was prepared and planned well.").
376. No. A-CV-13-90 (Navajo Dec. 5, 1990).
377. Id., slip op. at 3 (upholding Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoima, No. TC-CV-344-84 (Tuba
City Dist. Ct. Apr. 9, 1990) (Kuwanhyoima 1)).
378. Letter, supra note 23.
379. Estate of Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209, 211 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.
1986) (quoting Barry K. Berkson, Torts in Tribal Courts, Presentation to the National American
Indian Court Judges Association, Reno, Nev. (Jan. 28, 1970)).
380. The strict liability view is supported by an examination of traditional Navajo means of
dealing with tortfeasors. See 3 ViCENTi, supra note 16, at 149-50. Of critical significance,
however, is the fact that repayment for injury was only token and symbolic. Id. at 150. For
further discussion of this point, see infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text.
381. No. TC-CV-344-84 (Tuba City Dist. Ct. Apr. 9, 1990).




reasonableness, and individual dignity."3u The common law principle of
hozho, Bluehouse indicated, prohibited the use of "unreasonable force" by a
husband against his wife, and permitted him no interference with the dignity
of his wife when the two were separated?2 Furthermore, attempted rape and
severe beatings were prohibited under Navajo common law.3" Bluehouse
ruled that, because of the lack of "reason or proportionality" in the husband's
acts against his separated wife, the assaults contravened Navajo common
law. 
3
Bluehouse also noted that the doctrine of interspousal immunity did not
exist at Navajo common law, nor did the defense of provocation, although the
latter could be raised to diminish the plaintiffs recovery. 7 As for damages,
Bluehouse held that Navajo common law clearly entitled a woman "to fair
compensation for sexual assaults and rape." 31 On review of Kuwanhyoima
1, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court noted merely that "the district court
opinion and judgment appear regular on their face," though the application
and interpretation of Navajo common law was not specifically challenged by
the defendant."
B. Fault: Comparative Negligence
"Comparative negligence does not exist at Navajo common law," ruled
Judge Robert Yazzie of the Window Rock District Court in the 1986 decision,
Cadman v. Hubbard."' Indeed, it is questionable whether any conception of
tort fault existed in traditional Navajo society other than strict liability.39'
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of tort fault
under Navajo common law.
C. Wrongful Death
The tort of wrongful death is recognized at Navajo common law, according
to a 1986 decision of the Window Rock District Court.3" Referring to
expert testimony and a published speech on torts in tribal courts, Judge Yazzie
383. Il, slip op. at 2.
384. Id., slip op. at 2-3 (citing Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250,
252-53 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982)).
385. Id., slip op. at 4.
386. Id.
387. Id., slip op. at 3.
388. Id.
389. Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoima, No. A-CV-13-90, slip op. at 3 (Navajo Dec. 5, 1990)
(Kuwanhyoima 11).
390. 5 Navajo Rptr. 226, 229 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1986).
391. See supra note 380 and accompanying text. Note that, regardless of the applicable
common law, Navajo courts have in practice based tort awards on negligence. See, e.g., Navajo
Tribe of Indians v. Jones, 5 Navajo Rptr. 235 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1986).
392. Estate of Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209, 210-11 (Window Rock Dist.
Ct. 1986).
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held that the payment of restitutionary damages for the careless causing of the
death of another was part of the common law."
IX. Other Areas of Law
The Navajo courts have applied tribal common law to several problems not
falling into one of the broad categories described above. It should also be
acknowledged that Navajo common law has not yet been recognized at all in
several areas.3" Of course, simply because the courts have not yet applied
the common law in a particular area does not mean that it does not exist; an
abundance of legal customs and traditions have been catalogued and described
by anthropologists and other observers, including by Navajos themselves. 5
A. Civil Procedure
1. Res Judicata
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, in the 1992 decision In re Estate of
Begay #2,396 announced: "The principle of res judicata, which prohibits the
same dispute from being legally resolved more than once, is firmly grounded
in Navajo common law."3 ' The common law principle is that once a
decision has been made with regard to a dispute, that decision is respect-
ed.39 "The Navajo people did not learn this principle from the white man.
They have carried it with them through history."3"
The doctrine of res judicata, which is also established in the Navajo Rules
of Civil Procedure,' has been applied by the Navajo Court of Appeals to
affirm the power of the courts to issue final legal decisions,"2 and by the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court to allow district courts to sua sponte bar
relitigation of disputes recently resolved by the same court."
393. (d. at 213-14.
394. For example, one author has noted that "no substantive Navajo common law with
respect to tribal debts or obligations exists." Frye, supra note 31, at 289.
395. With respect to lending disputes, one commentator has noted that "[a]nthropological
sources suggest that traditions and customs regarding debts of tribal members did, and perhaps
still do, exist." Id. at 289. The commentator advises, consequently, that "creditors should be
aware that Navajo custom and tradition, if proved at trial, could preempt the commercial law
developed by the states." Id. at 292.
396. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6130 (Navajo 1992).
397. Id. at 6131.
398. Id. (quoting Halwood v. Estate of Badonie, No. A-CV-09-86, slip op. at 4 (Navajo July
1, 1988)).
399. Id. (quoting Halwood, No. A-CV-09-86, slip op. at 4).
400. NAvAio R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2)(H) (res judicata is an affirmative defense).
401. flalona v. MacDonald, I Navajo Rptr. 189, 205 (Navajo Ct. App. 1978).





While the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure define the requirements for
changing the venue of a trial," the threshold issue of where a party is
legally domiciled has been interpreted by the Navajo Court of Appeals to fall
within the purview of Navajo common law.4' In Halona v. MacDonald, a
1978 decision, the court held that Navajo custom dictated that a Navajo is
domiciled where his or her mother is "from."'45 The court explained that
"[plerhaps this custom may have to be breached in the future, but for the
present, Navajos may be considered to be domiciled where they maintain their
traditional and legal ties, regardless of where they actually live."''
Halona involved a dispute over where on the Navajo reservation the
defendant was domiciled for purposes of venue,' but the court's reasoning
was extended by the Window Rock District Court in 1983 to a case involving
a party who lived off the reservation in Utah.' District Court Judge Tom
Tso, interpreting Halona, ruled that, although the party lived elsewhere, he
was domiciled in the Navajo Nation and was therefore able to bring an action
in the Navajo courts.'
B. Contracts
Navajo contract law is largely governed by Anglo-American common law
and a tribal version of the Uniform Commercial Code.4 " Contract interpreta-
tion may in some cases, however, be subject to applicable Navajo common
law, according to a 1982 decision by Judge Tom Tso of the Window Rock
District Court, Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.' The
dispute in Apache concerned a divorced woman's claim to the proceeds of her
ex-husband's life insurance policy.'" Although the insurance contract had
403. NAvAjo R. Civ. P. 26.
404. Halona, I Navajo Rptr. at 195.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 191. The suit was originally brought in Shiprock, New Mexico, and the appellants
sought to change venue to Window Rock, Arizona. Id. Both communities are situated on the
Navajo reservation.
408. In re Adoption of S.C.M., 4 Navajo Rptr. 167, 167 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
409. Id. at 169. The appellant, while residing in Provo, Utah, was originally from Toh-la-kai,
on the Navajo reservation in New Mexico. Id. The district court, citing Halona, found his
domicile to be in the Navajo Nation. Id. The court explained that "[t]he Navajo rule of custom
domicile is comparable to the law of some nations which assign a national domicile to all
individuals born in their territory, even where they become citizens of other nations." Id.
410. See, e.g., Hood v. Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6061,
6062 (Navajo 1991) (citing 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 10 (1964) for requirements of valid
contract formation); NAvAjO UNIFORM COM. CODE, Res. No. CJA-1-86 (Jan. 29, 1986).
411. 3 Navajo Rptr. 250, 251 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
412. Id. at 250.
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not been altered after the divorce to remove the plaintiff as a beneficiary, Tso
held that Navajo common law dictated that a divorce be a final separation of
spouses, in the interest of quickly restoring community harmony."3 Because
local law was to be applied in construing insurance contracts, Navajo common
law operated to bar the plaintiff from collecting on the insurance policy.4 4
Although conflicts of laws questions are lurking within it, the Apache decision
may be limited to insurance and other contracts where local law prevails in
the interpretation of the contract terms.
C. Government
The Navajo courts have issued a few decisions, perhaps grounded in
Navajo common law, touching on the basic issues of governmental authority
and duty. In a 1974 opinion, Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co.,41 the
court of appeals noted "the customary division of governmental powers into
three (3) branches, executive, legislative, and judicial."4 '6 The court also
found the government's power of eminent domain to be "inherent" and
"essential to the existence of all governments."417 Whether Dennison can
really be called a Navajo common law decision, however, is doubtful: Navajo
custom and tradition is never specifically cited, and it appears that the above
language is based more on Anglo-American tradition and international law
than Navajo common law.""
Four years after Dennison, the court gave a less ambiguous ruling on
governmental powers."' In an opinion that was something of a Navajo
Marbury v. Madison, the court in Halona v. MacDonald established the right
of the Navajo courts to review Tribal Council actions.4" The power of
judicial nview, the court said, was based on
a traditional and abiding respect for the impartial adjudicatory
process. When all have been heard and the decision is made, it is
respected. This has been the Navajo way since before the time of
the present judicial system. The Navajo People did not learn this
413. Id. at 250, 254.
414. Id. at 253.
415. 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (Navajo Ct. App. 1974).
416. Id. at 100.
417. Id. at 98.
418. For example, the tripartite structure of government certainly does not derive from
Navajo tradition. See KLUcKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 91, at 122-23 (noting that Navajos
were, prior to 1868, so loosely organized that it is questionable whether they actually constituted
a "tribe"); see also Tom Tso, Looking to the Future, ARIz. ATr'Y, May 1992, at 9, 10 (discussing
the transition to a tripartite governmental structure in the NaVajo Nation); VINE DELORIA, JR., &
CLIFFORD I. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANs, AMERICAN JusTIcE 82-89 (1984) (discussing
traditional forms of tribal government).
419. 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (Navajo Ct. App. 1978).




principle from the white man. They have carried it with them
through history.
... Mhe People through their Council have delegated the
ultimate responsibility for [the dispensation of justice] to their
courts.!
Halona clearly based the independence and authority of the Navajo courts on
traditional law, thereby averting any potential challenges to that authority.4 "
At the same time, however, the decision acknowledged the court to be a
creation of the Tribal Council and, presumably, therefore subject to destruction




Some of the powers and duties of the Navajo courts have been held to be
based on Navajo common law. The court of appeals in 1984 noted that a court
was empowered under a "common rule" to correct judgments and reopen cases
where "justice and equity clearly requires it to do so."' Again, however,
whether the common rule is taken from Navajo common law or some other
body of law is unclear. Judge Tom Tso from the Window Rock District Court
in 1983 asserted that the Navajo courts had the duty under Navajo common law
to protect the property of the Navajo Nation and could therefore determine
whether sales of that property were in the best interests of the Navajo
people.4
D. Remedies and Punishments
1. Criminal
a) Restitution
Restitution was traditionally the remedy of choice for almost all offenses
committed between Navajos.4 Indeed, Judge Marie Neswood of the
Crownpoint District Court in 1982 found that restitution was "central to Navajo
tradition" and that, in criminal cases,
421. Id.
422. See also Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Bd. of Election Supervisors, 1 Navajo Rptr. 213, 215
(Navajo Ct. App. 1978) (reaffirming that judicial review of Tribal Council actions is mandated
by Navajo tradition and custom).
423. See Richard P. Fahey, Native American Justice: The Courts of the Navajo Nation, 59
JUDICATURE 10, 13 (1975) (noting that "[a]s the courts of the Navajo Nation derive their power
from the tribal council, they are legislative rather than constitutional in origin").
424. Navajo Eng. & Constr. Auth. v. Noble, 5 Navajo Rptr. 1, 1 (Navajo Ct. App. 1984).
425. Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 159, 159-61 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983);
see also Jones, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 256 (quoting Tome, 4 Navajo Rptr. at 159).
426. See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 2, at 43-45 (indicating that restitution was the
traditional remedy for rape, robbery, seduction, theft, trespass, homicide, etc.); 2 VICENTI, supra
note 16. at 159.
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the central ideas of punishment were to put the victim in the
position he or she was [in] before the offense by a money payment,
punish in a visible way [by] requiring extra payments to the victim
or the victim's family (rather than the king or state), and give a
visible sign to the community that [the] wrong was punished.4
Neswood noted that robbery that resulted in injury traditionally required the
payment of "blood money" to the immediate family of the victim, as well as
compensation for the stolen property.4 Theft was similarly dealt with by
requiring restitution.4 Applying these principles of Navajo common law to
the juvenile armed robber before the court, Neswood imposed an order requiring
restitution by the offender and held that the remedy of restitution "should be
presumed to be required in any juvenile disposition."'"
b) Probation and Parole
Associate Justice Homer Bluehouse, in a 1992 Navajo Nation Supreme Court
solicitor's opinion, is cited as noting that the Anglo-style probation and parole
system of the Navajo Nation did not exist in traditional Navajo society and that,
therefore, Navajo common law could only be applied obliquely to questions
about how such a system should work.43' The solicitor's opinion itself
concludes that Navajo common law demanded that all persons, whether
criminally convicted or not, be accorded at least a minimum level of respect for
their privacy.4 As a result, Navajo common law dictated against allowing
unrestrained random alcohol testing to be imposed as a condition of parole or
probation:'33
In an earlier opinion, however, the court's solicitor in 1983 concluded that
banishment was an acceptable condition of probation under Navajo common
law!' "Shunning," or the deliberate ostracizing of an offender by the commu-
nity, was a traditional Navajo method of dealing with "those who repeatedly
offended or flaunted the will of the community."4 Banishment, therefore, was
essentially an extension of a time-honored Navajo practice.
c) Punishment
The use of punishment as a means of dealing with criminal offenders is in
427. In re Interest of D.P., 3 Navajo Rptr. 255, 257 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 1982).
428. Id. at 257 (citing Van Valkenburgh, supra note 2, at 45).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 257-58.
431. Random Alcohol-Use Testing of Parolees and Probationers, Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal
Courts, No. 92-05, slip op. at 6-7 (Sept. 30, 1992).
432. Id., slip op. at 13.
433. Id., slip op. at 14.






some ways foreign to Navajo common law. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court
has acknowledged that "actual coercion or punishment were actions of last resort
in Navajo common law,"'" and Associate Justice Homer Bluehouse confirmed
in 1982 that restitution was traditionally the favored solution" 8 Banishment
of an offender as a punishment for particularly egregious crimes is grounded in
Navajo common law, however, as noted above.!"9 The supreme court in 1991
noted that "Navajos would shun a repeat offender, or one who committed a
particularly heinous crime."' 0 The court has not discussed Navajo common
law notions of punishment beyond these statements, however."'
2. Civil
a) Restitution
Restitution as a remedy in civil cases was upheld under Navajo common law
by the Window Rock District Court under Judge Robert Yazzie in the 1986
decision, In re Estate of Benally v. Navajo Nation." Citing to expert testimo-
ny and a published work on Navajo law, Yazzie held that "[c]ompensation for
wrongful death of a human being is and always has been recognized at Navajo
common law.""' 3 In general,
the "Nalyeeh" (a paying back of restitution), seems to be used today
mostly in connection with what would be considered civil matters,
but in the past this symbolic restitution was usually all that would
be required of the person who committed a criminal act, as well.
437. Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6049,
6050 (Navajo 1991). For an anthropological perspective on the Navajo aversion to iunishment,
see JOHN LAD, THE STRUCTURE OF A MORAL CODE 287-88 (1957).
438. Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal Courts, No. 83-3, slip op. at 4-5 (Jan. 31, 1983). The
conclusion that restitution was the predominant traditional form of punishment of criminal
offenders was also drawn by Judge Marie Neswood in a 1982 decision of the Crownpoint District
Court, In re Interest of D.P.: "The offender was given the means to return to the community by
making good his or her wrong. Surely this is a far better concept of justice than to leave the
victim out of the process of justice and ... with no means of healing the injury done." In re
Interest of D.P., 3 Navajo Rptr. 255, 257 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 1982).
439. Op. Solic. Navajo Tribal Courts, No. 83-3, slip op. at 5 (Jan. 31, 1983).
440. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 6050.
441. Widely noted in the anthropological literature is the traditional Navajo view that
witchcraft and incest were the most horrific of all crimes. See, e.g., Richard Van Valkenburgh,
Navajo Common Law 1I: Navajo Law and Justice, 9 MUSEUM NOTES: MUSEUM OF N. ARIZ. 51,
51-54 (1937). Both crimes (and apparently only these two crimes) were sanctioned by execution.
Id. at 52, 54. Homicide, on the other hand, was traditionally dealt with by requiring restitution
from the killer to the victim's family. Id. at 52. Because the criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo
tribal courts is limited to non-major crimes, these aspects of the traditional law are not likely to
be confronted anytime soon. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
442. 5 Navajo Rptr. 209, 213-14 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1986).
443. Id. at 212.
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Nalyeeh, traditionally, has power to correct wrongs of any kind.4 "
Yazzie rioted that restitution traditionally came in the form of livestock and
other valuable goods, and that these commodities were of practical and not
merely symbolic value.4 " Accordingly, monetary awards were appropriate
in wrongful death actions, especially in light of the diminished economic
value of the traditional items of nalyeeh.4" Under Navajo common law and
the Navajo Nation Tribal Code, Yazzie ruled, restitution could be awarded in
the form of special damages, general damages, damages for pain and
suffering, and damages for the worth of the life of the decedent.
While Benally was a wrongful death action, the restitution arguments of
that opinion were later cited by Judge Yazzie in a case involving a tortious
injury.' " Similarly, in the 1990 decision Kuwanhyoima I, the Tuba City
District Court awarded restitution damages, under Navajo common law, to the
victim of a sexual assault.4 9 Acting as judge in Kuwanhyoima I, Associate
Justice Homer Bluehouse also noted that common law allowed "in some
instances" for compensation to the family or clan of the victim 50 This
aspect of nalyeeh - the spreading of restitution awards among the relatives
of the plaintiff - has yet to be clearly explained by the Navajo courts.
b) Equity
The responsibility of Navajo courts under common law to employ
principles of equity has been noted briefly by the Navajo high court in at least
two decisions 5 The court has never discussed what those principles might
be, however, and the influence of Navajo common law in this area is unclear.
c) Garnishment
The remedy of court-imposed garnishment of wages, at least in a child
support situation, was upheld under Navajo common law by the Navajo Court
of Appeals in 1983.45 Without discussing whether garnishment was
specifically permitted under common law, the court noted at the outset of its
opinion that the remedy would only be applied if not "found to be contrary
to ... Navajo common law (either decisional or customary)."'453
444. Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
445. Id. at 213.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 213-14.
448. Cadman, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 230.
449. Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoima, No. TC-CV-344-84, slip op. at 3 (Tuba City Dist. Ct.
Apr. 9, 1990) (Kuwanhyoima 1).
450. Id., slip op. at 3.
451. Begay v. Keedah, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6021, 6023
(Navajo 1991); Navajo Eng. & Constr. Auth., 5 Navajo Rptr. at 2.
452. Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Foster, 4 Navajo Rptr. 86 (Navajo Ct. App. 1983).





Tribal courts, of course, are in a sense only one more manifestation of the
forced imposition of Anglo-American culture and values on Native American
societies." No such institutions existed in North America before European
contact,5 5 and the original tribal courts were perceived by the aggressors as
"mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities" designed to eradicate the
last vestiges of Indian culture in the name of "civilization.
4
1
The nature of tribal courts has changed over the past century, however.
While the institution itself may still be intrinsically offensive to traditional
Native American ideas of how justice ought to be administered, and may still
exist in part to ease the minds of Americans convinced that justice can be
administered in no other fashion, tribes are increasingly employing the courts
as tools in the struggle for sovereignty and cultural independence. Perhaps the
most promising of such efforts has been to bring tribal common law into use
and thereby to begin the process of institutionalizing traditional norms and
values.
The courts of the Navajo Nation have been building a common law
jurisprudence for nearly a quarter of a century. As discussed above, that
jurisprudence has touched many areas - from probate to contract law, family
to tort law, criminal to civil law.4 Clearly, some of the areas have been
developed more than others. Twenty-four decisions have been handed down
applying Navajo customs and traditions to family matters such as marriage,
divorce, child custody, and adoption; only two decisions have dealt with
traditional Navajo crimes.458 The area of individual rights has received
considerable attention from the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, but only since
1987 has Navajo common law been acknowledged and used as a foundation
for those rights; on the other hand, the tribal courts have been applying
Navajo common law in probate matters at least since the first publication of
decisions in 19695' The reasons for these differences in timing and pace
454. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts
and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49,
52-53 (1988).
455. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 230 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982).
456. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 574 (D. Or. 1888). For discussions of the culturally
destructive aims of the CFR courts, see DELORIA, JR., & LYTLE, supra note 387, at 115; Russel
Lawrence Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the Police
Idea in American Indian Policy, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 25, 36-39 (Lawrence
Rosen ed., 1976). See also Zion, supra note 2, at 265; Wright, supra note 1, at 1400.
457. See supra notes 128-453 and accompanying text.
458. See the appendix following this comment. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying
text.
459. See the appendix following this comment.
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of the courts' explication of the tribal common law are undoubtedly sever-
al, but the result is clear: the common law is now firmly established as
the law of choice in the courts of the Navajo Nation." Given that reality,
Navajo common law jurisprudence will continue to develop, offering other
tribes and non-Native Americans alike the opportunity to not only observe the
emergence of a new written body of law, but to consider the unique aspects
of that law with an eye to serious moral, philosophical, and legal introspec-
tion.
460. See supra notes 129-32, 319-20 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Navajo Common Law Jurisprudence, 1969-1992'
Source or Common Law
Area of Citation
Law Judldal TMtiSs Expert N-J.o 
Non-
Notice Tentimony Predcet N.vJo
precedent
Family in re Marriage of
Daw, 0 0
I Navajo Rptr. 1
(Navajo C. App.
1969)
Probate In re Trust of Benally,
I Navajo Rptr. 10 0
(Navajo C. App.
1969)
Probate In re Estate of Lee
I Navajo Rptr. 27 0
(Navajo Ct. App.
1971)
Got, Dennison v. Tucson
Property Gas & Electric Co., I
Navajo Rptr. 95 0
(Navajo CL App.
1974)
Property Halona v. MacDonald,
Gov't. 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 0
Civ.Pro. (Navajo C. App.
1978)
Gov't Yazzie v. Navajo Bd.
of Election Super- •
visors, I Navajo Rptr.
213 (Navajo C. App.
1978)
Probate In re Estate of
Benally, I Navajo 0 0
Rptr. 219 (Navajo CL
App. 1978)
Family In re Marriage of
Ketchum, 2 Navajo d S
Rptr. 102 (Navajo C.
App. 1979)
1. While this listing is an attempt to bring together all of the published Navajo tribal court
decisions bearing on Navajo common law, it is necessarily less than exhaustive. Some decisions
are unclear in setting forth the legal basis of the ruling; others mention customs and traditions but
apparently do not make use of them or explain their usage; and still other possible candidates for
inclusion are not opinions, but Navajo Nation Supreme Court "orders" of uncertain precedential
status. Finally, the author unfortunately did not have the opportunity to conduct a search of the
district court files for relevant unpublished opinions. See supra note 26 of this comment.
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Source of Common Law
Area of Citation
Law Jd Tmtts-" Extrt NamiJ. Non.
Noice Testlimoy Precedent Nayoaj
i'rteedemt
Family. Johnson v. Johnson,
Property 3 Navajo Rptr. 9 0
(Navajo CL App.
1980)
Family. Earl v. Earl, 3 Navajo
Property Rptr. 16 (Navajo CL S
App. 1980)
Other
2  Bryant v. Bryant,
3 Navajo Rptr. 194
(Shiprock Dist. CL
1981)
Mediation In re Marriage of
Allison, 3 Navajo Rptr. *
199 (Window Rock
Dist. Ct. 1982)
Family In re Marriage of




Goldtooth, 3 Navajo 0
Rptr. 223 (Window
Rock DisL CL 1982)
Family. Lente v. Notah,
Custom 3 Navajo Rptr. 72 0 0
(Navajo CL App.
1982)
Property Shirley v. James,
3 Navajo Rptr. 83 0
(Navajo CL App.
1982)
Family, Apache v. Republic
Custom. Nafl Life Ins. Co.,
Contract 3 Navajo Rptr. 250 0
(Window Rock Dist.
CL 1982)
Criminal, In re Interest of D.P.,
Remedll 3 Navajo Rptr. 255 0 •
(Crownpoint Dist. CL
1982)
Family Tom v. Tom, 4 Navajo
Rptr. 12 (Navajo CL 0
App. 1983) 1 1 1 1
2. The district court in Bryant established the right of jurors to take into account Navajo
culture in making decisions. Bryant v. Bryant, 3 Navajo Rptr. 194, 194 (Shiprock Dist. Ct. 1981).
440
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Source of Common Law
Area or Citation
Law Judkidl TMtUs Fxport NaUJo Non-
Notice Testhnony Precedent Navajo
Preedent
Family. Ration v. Robertson,
Propcr7. 4 Navajo Rptr. 15
Rights. (Navajo CL App.
1 1983) 1 1
Property. Tome v. Navajo
Custom. Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. *
Gov't 159 (Navajo CL App.
1983)
Family4  Peshlaka v. Redd,
4 Navajo Rptr. 164
(Window Rock Dist.
CL 1983)
Family. In re Adoption of
Civ. Pro. S.C.M., 4 Navajo Rptr. 0 0
167 (Window Rock
Dist. Ct. 1983)
Reme- Navajo Tribal Util.
dies5  Auth. v. Foster,
4 Navajo Rptr. 86
(Navajo CL App.
1983)
Property Estate of Joe, 4 Navajo
Rptr. 99 (Navajo CL 0
App. 1983)
Probate, In re Estate of
Custom Apachee, 4 Navajo 0 0
Rptr. 178 (Window
Rock Dist. CL 1983) 1
Custom6  Johnson v. Dixon,
4 Navajo Rptr. 108
(Navajo CL App.
1983)
3. The court noted the trial court's ruling that Navajo common law "dictates that a male give
up certain property rights upon dissolution of a 'common law' marriage," but declined to consider
the question on appeal for lack of ripeness. Ration v. Robertson, 4 Navajo Rptr. 15, 15 (Navajo
Ct. App. 1983).
4. The district court ordered the parties to submit evidence on the "custom law aspects, both
Navajo and Ute, of child custody under the facts of this case," which involved a paternity dispute
between a Ute father and a Navajo mother. Peshlakai v. Redd, 4 Navajo Rptr. 164, 164-65
(Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983).
5. The court noted that it would only uphold a garnishment remedy if consistent with Navajo
common law. Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Foster, 4 Navajo Rptr. 86, 87 (Navajo Ct. App. 1983).
6. The court of appeals noted that the Navajo Tribal Council had intended that the tribal
courts "apply Navajo law, consisting of Navajo statutes, the common law (custom) and decisional
law" before resorting to state law. Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Navajo Rptr. 108, 110 (Navajo Ct. App.
1983).
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Source of Common Law
Area of Citation
Law Jdid.1 Trmtb Epxrt N.eojo Non.
Note Teeloony Predant Nnwvjo
l'nu.cent
Family In re Interest of JJ.S.,
4 Navajo Rptr. 192 S
(Window Rock Dist.
CL 1983)
Gov't Navajo Eng. & Constr.
Auth. v. Noble,











5 Navajo Rptr. 30
(Navajo CL App.
1985)
Property In re Estate of
Wauneka, 5 Navajo 0 0
Rptr. 79 (Navajo 1986)
Torts, Estate of Benally v.
Remedies Navajo Nation,
5 Navajo Rptr. 209 . 0 0 0
(Window Rock Dist.
CL 1986)
Torts. Cadman v. Hubbard,
Remedies 5 Navajo Rptr. 226 0 0
(Crownpoint Dist. CL
1986)
Family. Sells v. Sells,
Custom 5 Navajo Rptr. 104 •
(Navaio 1986)
Probate In re Estate of
Thomas, 5 Navajo 0
Rptr. 232 (Window
Rock Dist. CL 1986)
Property. Navajo Tribe of
Gov't Indians v. Jones,
5 Navajo Rptr. 235•
(Window Rock Dist.
CL 1986)
7. While declining to validate a marriage between a Navajo and non-Navajo, the court of
appeals mentioned that it "was impressed by the arguments of counsel for the petitioner which
recounted a history of non-Navajos adopting a Navajo way of life and becoming a part of their
communty." Marriage of Garcia, 5 Navajo Rptr. 30, 30 (Navajo Ct. App. 1985).
442
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Source of Common Law
Area of Citation
Law Judicial Tnet-ses Enpert NavaJo Non.
Notko Testimony Precedent Navajo
Precmdent
Family Notah v. Francis,
5 Navajo Rptr. 147 0 0
(Navajo 1987)
Custom In re Estate of Belone
v. Yazzie, 0
5 Navajo Rptr. 161
(Navajo 1987)
Family. Davis v. Davis,
Rights 5 Navajo Rplr. 169 0
(Navajo 1987)
Probate. In re Estate of Benally
Custom' v. Denetclaw,
5 Navajo Rptr. 174
(Navajo 1987)
Family, Navajo Nation v.
Rights Murphy, 15 Indian L
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. 0 0
Training Program)
6035 (Navajo 1988)
Civ Pro Halwood v. Estate of
Badonie, No. A-CV- 0 0
09-86, slip op. (Navajo
July 1. 1988)
Rights Begay v. Navajo
Nation, 15 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. S
Training Program)
6032 (Navajo 1988)
Family. In re A.W., 15 Indian
Criminal. L Rep. (Am. Indian 0 0
Rights Law. Training Program)
_____ 6041 (Navalo 1988) ____
Family Descheenie v.
Mariano, 15 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. 0
Training Program)
6039 (Navajo 1988)
Probate In re Estate of
Thomas, 15 Indian L
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. • 0
Training Program)
6053 (Navajo 1988)
8. Although the plaintiff had pleaded that Navajo custom should govern the division of the
estate at issue, he did not allege how. In re Estate of Benally v. Denetclaw, 5 Navajo Rptr. 174,
176 (Navajo 1987). Thus, the supreme court declined to employ Navajo common law in deciding
the case. Id.
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Source of Common Law
Area ol' Citation
JdJdal Treatis Elprt Na"Jo Non.
Notlm Testimny Prodtnt Navsjo
Prcedent
Rights Billie v. Abbott,
16 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0
Training Program)
6021 (Navajo 1988)
Family In re Marriage of
Francisco, 16 Indian L




9  Tafoya v. Navajo
Nation Bar Ass'n,




Rights, Boos v. Yazzie,
Govt 17 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0
Training Program)
6115 (Navajo 1990)
Family Arizona Pub. Serv. Co.
Rights v. Office of Navajo
Labor Relations, 0 S 0




Rights Plummer v. Plummer,
17 Indian L Rep.





Remedita TC-CV-344-84, slip 0 0
op. (Tuba City Dist.
Ct. Apr. 9, 1990)
Rights, Bennett v. Navajo Bd.
Custom of Election Super-
visors, 18 Indian L. S
Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Pro-gram)
6009 (Navajo 1990)
9. In Tafoya, the supreme court discussed the important role that Navajo advocates play in
bringing traditional perspectives before the courts. Tafoya v. Navajo Nation Bar Ass'n, 16 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6120, 6121 (Navajo 1989). See supra note 41 of
this comment.
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Source of Common Law
Area of Citation
Law Judldal Tm eat E p rt N avaJo Non-
Noton Thitmony Precdent NawJo
Precedent
Property Hood v. Bordy,
18 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0 0
Training Program)
6061 (Navajo 1991)
Family Alonzo v. Martine,
18 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0 0
Training Program)
6129 (Navajo 1991)
Property In re Harvey & Begay
#2, 19 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. • S
Training Program)
6003 (Navajo 1991)
Property. Begay v. Keedah,
Probate 19 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0 0
Training Program)
6021 (Navajo 1991)
Criminal. Navajo Nation v.
Remedies Platero, 19 Indian L
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. 0
Training Program)
6049 (Navajo 1991)
Rights Navajo Nation v.
MacDonald, Sr.,




Property Williams v. Yazzie,
19 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. 0
Training Program)
6116 (Navajo 1992)
Property Yazzie v. Catron,
19 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. S S
Training Program)
6125 (Navajo 1992)
Family Nez v. Nez,
19 Indian L Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. S
Training Program)
6123 (Navajo 1992)
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Source or Common Law
Area ol' CitationLaw Jodid.l Trentba Expert Navajo Non-
Notice Testimony proedent Navaja
I'r,"dnt
Civ Pro. In re Estate of Begay
Rights #2, 19 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law.
Training Program)
6130 (Navajo 1992)
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